













A NEW WAY FORWARD OR THE OLD WAY BACK?  
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE IRAQ SURGE. 
 
 
A thesis presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of 
Western Carolina University in partial fulfillment of the 




Matthew T. Buchanan 
 
 
Director: Dr. Richard Starnes 
Associate Professor of History, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. 
 
Committee Members: Dr. David Dorondo, History, 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  iv 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
Chapter One: Perceptions of the Iraq War: Early Origins of the Surge . . . . . . . . . 17 
Chapter Two: Winning the Iraq Home Front: The Political Strategy of the Surge.  38 
Chapter Three: A Change in Approach: The Military Strategy of the Surge . . . . .  62 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 






ACU - Army Combat Uniform 
ALICE - All-purpose Lightweight Individual Carrying Equipment 
BDU - Battle Dress Uniform 
BFV - Bradley Fighting Vehicle 
CENTCOM - Central Command  
COIN - Counterinsurgency 
COP - Combat Outpost 
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority 
CROWS- Common Remote Operated Weapon System 
CRS- Congressional Research Service 
DBDU - Desert Battle Dress Uniform 
HMMWV - High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle 
ICAF - Industrial College of the Armed Forces 
IED - Improvised Explosive Device 
ISG - Iraq Study Group 
JSS - Joint Security Station 
MNC-I - Multi-National-Corps-Iraq 
MNF- I - Multi-National Force – Iraq Commander 
MOLLE - Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment 
MRAP - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) 
QRF - Quick Reaction Forces 
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade 
SOI - Sons of Iraq 
UNICEF - United Nations International Children’s Fund 







A NEW WAY FORWARD OR THE OLD WAY BACK? COUNTERINSURGENCY IN 
THE IRAQ SURGE. 
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Director: Dr. Richard Starnes 
 
This work will consist of three chapters and a conclusion. The goal is to explain the 
need for the Surge, its image, and its relative success. Many of the histories written 
about the Surge appear within the first three years of the operation. Over a decade has 
passed since the start of the Surge in early 2007, and sources have come to light that 
did not exist in the immediate aftermath. Using these sources involves looking at the 
events that made the Surge a viable option, the political policy used in Iraq, and the 
tactical strategy employed by the US military and coalition forces. Also, new evidence 
allows for previous claims of success to be analyzed in a nuanced way and draw 





 In a television address January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced, 
“Tonight in Iraq, the armed forces of the United States are engaged in a struggle that 
will determine the direction of the global war on terror and our safety here at home. The 
new strategy I outline tonight will change America's course in Iraq and help us succeed 
in the fight against terror.”1 These words marked the commencement of the Iraq Surge, 
which increased the military strength in the Baghdad region by an additional 30,000 
troops and a change of strategy. The new plan received criticism and support from both 
parties represented in Congress. The opposition to the Surge focused on the overall 
cost in dollars, lives, and long-term consequences. The supporters of the Surge viewed 
the action as a display of resolve to win the war. In the immediate aftermath, the 
consensus about the outcome suggests the Surge was an operational success, but a 
closer examination offers a more nuanced conclusion. The purpose of this research is 
to examine claims made about the Surge and review them using information that has 
surfaced over the past decade. The first step is to define the Surge and the parts of the 
strategy that added a new approach in Iraq. 
 The Surge was an increase of combat power into the Baghdad Province in 2007. 
It included operations designed to decrease regional violence, to increase the logistical 
capabilities, and to hinder growth of terrorist cells. The Surge had its roots in a bi-
partisan group appointed by congress in 2006 to determine a way forward for the U.S. 
in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group (ISG) suggested a new strategy that would allow the Iraqi 
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government and military to take a larger role in day-to-day operations.  Also, the group 
laid out plans for a large increase of troops to quell sectarian violence and restore order. 
The report presented offered two choices. First, the ISG suggested a military cordon of 
Baghdad to cut off enemy personnel and supplies. The second phase of ISG 
recommendations included increasing the security forces within the city by establishing 
Joint Security Stations (JSS) and Combat Outposts (COP). In addition to more soldiers, 
the plan also expanded an ongoing strategy of recruiting local leaders as implemented 
by Multi-National Force- Iraq Commander (MNF-I) General George Casey and U.S. 
Central Command Commander (CENTCOM) General John Abizaid. 2  
Additional troops were opposed by both General Casey and General Abizaid, 
who argued an increase would only deliver a temporary solution to the deep 
factionalism separating political leaders in Iraq. However, the divide within the Iraqi 
political structure arose from more than secular differences. The ongoing sectarian 
violence between the Sunni and Shia compounded tensions. U.S. politicians, such as 
Representatives Ron Paul, Walter Johnson, and Jim Duncan believed the Surge would 
favor the Shia as a result of the changing demographics in Baghdad, causing long-term 
complications for any reconciliation The loudest supporters of the Surge in Congress, 
Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, believed anything short of a complete 
military victory in Iraq would signal weakness in the international community. To 
implement the strategy correctly, the US needed a unified approach. President Bush 
replaced Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates. Also, General 
                                                           
2 James Addison Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, The Iraq Study Group 
Report (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 22-30. 
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Raymond Odierno, an avid supporter of the Surge, replaced General Peter Chiarelli as 
the commander of the Multi-National-Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). Finally, General David 
Petraeus took as the commanding General of MNC-I, and with the help of analysts at 
Fort Leavenworth, produced a counterinsurgency field manual and stood ready to 
implement this new plan for Iraq.3 
 The year preceding the Surge was bloody and violent. The loss of American 
soldiers and civilian lives continued to rise due to the unrest and sectarian violence. 
General Casey cautioned that the increase of US troops would lead to a lengthened 
amount of time before the Iraqi government took control, while also augmenting the 
division between factions in Iraq. Despite warnings of current and previous leadership in 
Iraq, such as General Casey, General Abizaid, General Paul Eaton, General Charles 
Swannack, and General John Batiste, the implementation of the Surge offered a new 
direction in a war that had bogged down. Instead of allowing the Iraq government to act 
as a sovereign state and solve national issues over time, the United States elected for a 
more aggressive approach in an attempt to manipulate the outcome of a complex 
situation.4 The concept of increasing troop levels to change the momentum of a war is 
not new, but the motivations behind the choice often vary. Thus, the motivation behind 
the Surge requires exploration in order to understand operational goals and analyze the 
outcome. 
 The Surge is a recent event but is far from a unique phenomenon. Academics 
are divided about how the Surge was a success. Historian Kimberly Kagan was the first 
                                                           
3 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 363-380. 
4 David E. Sanger, Michael R. Gordon and John F. Burns, "Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in '06, Bush 




academic to publish a book about this phase of the Iraq War. Founder of the Institute for 
the Study of War in Washington, D.C. and author of The Surge: A Military History, she 
also taught at West Point, Yale, Georgetown, and American University. She served as a 
member of General Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment team during his 
campaign review in June and July 2009 in Afghanistan. She was a member the 
Academic Advisory Board at the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at 
CENTCOM.  She conducted multiple research trips to Iraq between May 2007 and April 
2010 while General Petraeus and General Raymond T. Odierno served as the MNF-I 
Commanding General. She participated formally on the Joint Campaign Plan 
Assessment Team for MFN-I from October 2008 and October 2009 and as part of the 
Civilian Advisory Team for CENTCOM’s strategic review in January 2009. Per the 
bibliography, her research was active during the operation and her sources were 
retrieved from her own organization. Therefore, her book is less an historical analysis 
than a contemporary account of a strategy the author had a hand in creating.5  
 Kagan admits that while she believes the Surge was a success, the complexity of 
the operation offers opportunities for alternate interpretations. However, Kagan 
contends that “the current conflict has been presented largely through disjointed horror 
stories and is a very real problem, the result of which is that citizens with only the 
vaguest conceptions of ongoing operations feel qualified to pronounce their own 
country’s defeat.”6 Kagan clearly sets out to address the idea that the war on terrorism 
was not a spur of the moment decision, and seeks to display the deep level of 
                                                           
5  Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History, xiv-xv.; "Dr. Kimberly Kagan," Institute for the 
Study of War, accessed August 15, 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/press-media/staff-bios/dr-
kimberly-kagan, 1. 
6 Kagan, The Surge: A Military History, xiv. 
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preparation taken by the United States military leadership. The book covers the period 
from January 2007 to the spring of 2008. The theoretical azimuth of her work is set on 
liberal intervention, which allows intervening in the affairs of sovereign nations for both 
foreign policy and humanitarian objectives. Kagan openly aims her arguments to 
reinforce the actions of the Bush Administration by concluding that the foundation for 
theory and doctrine involving a successful counterinsurgency is demonstrated through 
the Surge.   
Kagan drew the supporting evidence for this book from limited sources. Her main 
resource is the Institute of War Studies to give an inside look at the operational 
structure. She uses the New York Times and Time Magazine to display the mainstream 
coverage of the Surge and the construction of US perceptions. The last group of 
sources used consists of official press releases and public statements. Kagan takes a 
top-down approach in her book. Interviews from key US military leaders and 
government officials in charge of the strategy in Iraq helps shape her narrative of the 
Surge. 
 William Knowlton, Jr, a Professor of Behavioral Science in the Department of 
Strategic Leadership, is a part of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at 
the National Defense University. He subscribes to success of the Surge revolving 
around the reduction of sectarian violence. While reflecting on the Surge in 2010, he 
concludes that the largest reason for this decrease was innovative leadership on the 
part of General Petraeus and his staff and credits him with forming a strategy upon his 
appointment to lead the war in Iraq. The four points Knowlton discusses begin with 
Petraeus adopting a political strategy of seeking a cease-fire with individual groups and 
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key actors. By accomplishing this, General Petraeus sought to win the hearts and minds 
of the leadership in Iraq. Secondly, diplomatic relations in the Baghdad region allowed 
the coalition forces to build relationships with individual factions and control internal 
violence. Next, the Surge sought to equip the local and Iraqi government with the ability 
to control their own areas, therefore taking the pressure off the military. Lastly, to 
accomplish the first three goals, the Surge sought to remove instigators of sectarian 
violence from power.7 
 The importance of Knowlton’s work is that he provides explanation of what he 
believes to be a successful strategy and highlights obstacles that had to be overcome. 
The violence towards civilians in 2006 had damaged the image of US soldiers in Iraq. 
The belief was that this approach would alleviate some of the pressure on soldiers 
through building rapport with people in the area. With the local population supporting the 
coalition forces, Petraeus could focus his attention on Iraqi leadership and facilitate an 
atmosphere of cooperation for peace by decreasing conflict over sectional differences.8  
Knowlton also believes that the operation faced an uphill battle for support in the 
United States. The analysis of the teamwork between General Petraeus and 
Ambassador Ryan Crocker offers a new explanation for successful aspects of the 
Surge. Ambassador Crocker was an experienced diplomat who had been sent to 
Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, and Pakistan prior to Iraq. He was a student of the Middle East 
and also fluent in Arabic. The combination of General Petraeus and Ambassador 
Crocker created relationship that put diplomatic and military goals on the same page. 
                                                           
7 William Knowlton. The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq (, Industrial College 
of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Washington D.C., 2010), accessed January 24, 2018, 
http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo69309, 9-10. 
8 William Knowlton. The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq, 11-13. 
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Part of the military genius displayed by General Petraeus, according to Knowlton, was 
his ability to work with the government officials who controlled the resources needed to 
achieve political objectives set for the Surge. Knowlton’s focus also includes the 
controversial congressional hearings where the competence and character of Petraeus 
was questioned.9 Through Knowlton’s arguments, we see General Petraeus as an 
intellectual military leader, but also gifted in political maneuvering. 
The majority of materials used to support the author's claims are personally 
generated. Knowlton relies on conversations that he had directly with General Petraeus. 
To substitute for other parts of the story, the author uses briefings and testimony from 
Congressional hearings. The author uses polling from the Fox News network to gauge 
Surge support among the American public. Finally, Knowlton also consults with multiple 
secondary sources in support of his findings, which include both works of scholarship 
and personal accounts.  
 Historian Dale Andrade’s work, Surging South of Baghdad: The 3D Infantry 
Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008, was also published in 2010.  The 
majority of the Surge took place in the Baghdad Beltway. However, Andradé focuses on 
the most southern tip of Surge operations. This was a part of the Surge that was not 
readily covered in the mainstream media, but had definite effects on the outcome of the 
strategy. This book is a traditional military history of the 3rd Infantry Division and their 
strategic movements along the Tigris River. The author discusses the increase in 
troops, innovative tactics, and strategic vision implemented by the Unit US military. 
However, a key for success identified by Andrade was not a standard recognized 
                                                           
9 Ibid, 10-14. 
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military achievement. Instead, in a chapter called “What Winning Looks Like,” he 
explores economic and humanitarian factors that made the Surge a success.10   
 First, Andrade makes a claim that the economic situation in Iraq improved 
significantly due to the actions taken during the Surge. His evidence to support this 
comes from an interview of General Rick Lynch in a 3rd Infantry Division newsletter 
called the Dog Face Daily, where Lynch stated, “Roads that were laced with IEDs a 
year ago are now littered with thriving markets.”11 Second, he highlights humanitarian 
successes, which are a difficult factor to gauge due to a lack of information. The author 
once again relies on the assessment of General Lynch that, “Bombed out buildings are 
now schools and clinics.”12 Evidence of civilian casualties, destruction to infrastructure, 
or the loss of normalcy are not addressed. Instead, the presentation of evidence 
highlights only positive attributes of the Surge.  
 Andrade also spent time in Iraq while doing his research, and he uses interviews 
that he conducted while in Iraq. He also uses executive summaries, which offers insight 
into tactical approaches by the military. When acknowledging public approval or opinion, 
Andrade consults well-circulated magazines and journals. However, the bulk of sources 
relied on by the author are brigade specific. Mission reports and official military 
documentation are how Andrade makes the case for tactical superiority. His work 
focuses on the mission as they transpired with no coverage of the outcome when the 
                                                           
10  Dale Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad: The 3D Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in 
Iraq, 2007-2008, 383-392. 
11  “Marne 6 Sends: Meeting the Needs of the Iraqi People,” Dog Face Daily, 1 June 2008, 1.  
12   Ibid, 1.  
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combat subsided. Another work covering the Surge was written by a previous officer 
involved in the operation. 
 Peter Mansoor is a retired Colonel who served as an Executive Officer to 
General Petraeus, and was an early advocate of a troop increase in Iraq. He is also a 
professor of military history at Ohio State University. His contribution, Surge: My 
Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War, defends all 
declarations of success in 2013. According to Mansoor, the Surge was a military, 
political, and humanitarian success. He argues that the current situation in Iraq is not 
reflective of the achievements of the Surge. Mansoor sees Petraeus as a victor, and 
asserts the decline in Iraq did not officially start until President Bush left office.13 The 
focus of his work is to answer accusations by journalists and retired Generals that 
question the Surge as a viable operation. 
 Mansoor argues that the Surge was a turning point in American military history 
due to six points. The first was the Sunni Awakening and Reconciliation, which 
consisted of turning ordinary Sunnis against al Qaeda. Targeted special operations 
were next, which was the capture or killing of key terrorists. The development of Iraqi 
security forces turned every day Iraqi citizens into effective coalition partners. Civilian 
components focused on projects such as increasing electricity and oil production. The 
detainee operations and rule-of-law initiatives took preventive measures to stop 
insurgents from using detention camps as universities for terrorists. Finally, the Iraqi 
political component and strategic communications offered the opportunity to break the 
                                                           
13 Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008 (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2008), 152-153; Mansoor, Peter R. Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and 
the Remaking of the Iraq War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 18-46.  
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deadlock between Iraq's political factions and create a culture of support for the Iraq 
War in the United States.14 Thus far, the documentation of the Surge is lacking objective 
voices, or at the least individuals who carried out the operations. 
 The prevailing narrative of the Surge was designed by those closest to the 
development of the strategy. Many publications shaping the historiography of this event 
are previous assistants to generals or advisors to policy development. They have 
controlled the scholarship and the focus. The majority of scholarly writings concerning 
this event focuses on top leadership, paying little attention to over 130,000 troops who 
carried out the orders of the Surge. Historians often observe the Surge as a redirection 
in military strategy due to innovative thinking. However, regardless of the stance on this 
portion of the Surge, it has a clear influence on current military thinking on 
counterinsurgency. A bottom-up approach can offer insight into the Surge by exploring 
these events through a different lens. The work that follows attempts to bring a fresh 
historical perspective by focusing on the soldiers who fought as a part of the Surge.15 
This work will consist of three chapters and a conclusion. The goal is to explain 
the need for the Surge, its image, and its relative success. Many of the histories written 
about the Surge appear within the first three years of the operation. Over a decade has 
passed since the start of the Surge in early 2007, and sources have come to light that 
did not exist in the immediate aftermath. Using these sources involves looking at the 
                                                           
14 Ibid, 20-68.   
15 Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2010), 29-64. 
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events that made the Surge a viable option, the political policy used in Iraq, and the 
tactical strategy employed by the US military and coalition forces.    
 Chapter one will focus on the factors that led to the choosing and implementing 
of this specific strategy. The Surge was an operation that lasted over a year, and my 
research will seek to divide it into a political and tactical action plan. Chapter two will 
explore the political policy chosen for Baghdad and executed by the US military. The 
third chapter will investigate military involvement from a tactical standpoint by looking at 
different techniques used to secure Baghdad and restore the legitimacy of the Iraqi 
government. The conclusion will seek to connect the previous chapters and identify the 
inconsistencies in the traditional narrative of the Surge’s success.  
 The first chapter will argue that the choice to implement the Surge was not made 
on a whim, but rather following a chain of events that challenged the perceptions of the 
war in Iraq. The first shift was due to the second battle of Fallujah in November 2004. 
The size, violence, and loss of Operation Phantom Fury, also called Operation Al-Fajr, 
caused an immediate reaction in the United States. In the aftermath of this operation, 
the Iraq War became vulnerable to comparisons with previous conflicts. General 
Anthony Zinni, former CENTCOM Commander who served from 1965-2000, stated: “I 
have seen this movie, it was called Vietnam.” Fallujah was the bloodiest battle of the 
Iraq War and created the most casualties of any battle since the Battle of Hue City in 
1968. Fallujah represents a turning point in the Iraq War. Both support for the war and 
12 
 
the confidence that the US military could win suffered. Fallujah also changed the focus 
from a war against the Ba'athist government to a fight against insurgents.16 
 Another shift was the increase in attacks towards coalition soldiers and incited 
violence between the Sunni and Shia. The brutality of sectarian violence in Baghdad 
destabilized the region and decreased the legitimacy and control of the Iraqi 
government. The culmination of these factors damaged the mission in Iraq and by the 
end of 2005, also brought into question the capacity of the Bush administration to lead. 
As political approval ratings fell, several factors forced the military towards a change in 
strategy. The first step was the formation of the ISG in the spring of 2006. The ISG 
highlighted problems with the current military strategy, and their suggestions 
encouraged a new approach to the war in Iraq. Among those proposals was to plan a 
decrease the number of troops due to the diversion of resources from Afghanistan and 
the transfer of power to officials in Iraq. A key factor that became a justification for the 
Surge was the Sunni Awakening in the fall of 2006. After an alliance with Sunni led al-
Qaeda insurgents for several years, leadership in the Sunni communities in Baghdad 
removed their support. The new alliance with the United States, in combination with the 
December release of both the ISG report, and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual offered hope that an increase of troops could secure 
Baghdad.17  
                                                           
16  Dexter Filkins  and James Glanz and James Glantz, "With Airpower and Armor, Troops Enter Rebel-
Held City,  New York Times, November 08, 2004, accessed January 4, 2018, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/08/international/with-airpower-and-armor-troops-enter-rebelheld-
city.html; Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003–2005 (NY: Penguin 
Press, 2007). 338-362. 
17 Andrew J. Bacevich, America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, New York: Random 
House, 2016, 184-202; Iraq Study Group (U.S.), "The Iraq Study Group Report : Iraq Study Group (U.S.) : 
Free Download & Streaming," Internet Archive, December 2006, accessed January 4, 2018, 
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 The second chapter will explore the civil policy the United States sought to 
implement in Baghdad between January 2006 and May 2007. For an operation that 
lasted just over a year, expectations were immense. One of the primary goals of the 
Surge was to decrease sectarian and insurgent violence through the use of coalition 
forces and local militias. In addition, a reduction of violence would be an important factor 
for arguing the success of the Surge. Satellite imagery, collected by the University of 
California Los Angeles, offers a different explanation for the decrease of tension 
between the two factions in Baghdad. According to their data, Sunni neighborhoods 
went dormant, following targeted killings and a mass exodus, which removed the 
targeted population. Instead of a Surge influence, the findings of this report suggest that 
the reason behind the decline of local attacks was a product of the Shia successfully 
removing a large portion of the Sunni population. 
Another point of contention concerns the relative success of the rebuilding of 
infrastructure. The building of schools, reopening of local economies, and reinstating of 
the Iraqi government offered the potential for stability and a return to normalcy. 
However, the lack of coverage on this portion of the Surge by previous authors creates 
possibility for original research when seeking answers regarding the Surge’s success.18   
Since the conclusion of the Surge, documentation of these efforts has continued to be 
declassified and released. Additionally, the decade since the Surge has increased the 
                                                           
https://archive.org/details/theiraqstudygrou25686gut; The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual U.S. Army Field Manual no. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication no. 3-33.5. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), i-14. 
18 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 
2006-2008, (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 200-205; William Knowlton. The Surge: General Petraeus 
and the Turnaround in Iraq (Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, 
Washington D.C., 2010), accessed January 24, 2018, http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo69309, 9-10.  
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number of veterans who have retired, been discharged, or are more willing to discuss 
the operation. The combination of these sources will offer a fresh look at the Surge, 
while considering previous findings.  
An additional plan for stability in Baghdad was the funding of local groups, like 
the Sons of Iraq (SOI) consisting of local residents and former insurgents from the 
region. Information released to the American public offered a way to gain and keep 
support of the new strategy. The desired outcome was to show an increase of local 
involvement in the media and display a shift of power from the United States to Iraqi 
officials. Cooperation between these two governments would show hope for a long-term 
democracy and a validation of the United States involvement in the Middle East. The 
US government plan contended that “the Pentagon team would portray a ‘new Iraq’ 
offering hope of a prosperous and democratic future, which would serve as a model for 
the Middle East.” American, British, and Iraqi media experts would be hand-picked to 
provide "approved USG information" for the Iraqi public, while ensuing a strategic 
information campaign displaying the transition towards a representative government 
over a period of one year. To accurately assess this approach, a review of fund 
allocation using media and congressional financial reports. The exploration of these 
documents dispay which groups received funding, how was it reported, and whether 
there were safeguards in place to avoid misallocation or abuse of resources.19   
                                                           
19 Donnelly, Thomas, and Frederick W. Kagan. Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on 
 New Battlefields. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2010, 2-24; Joyce Battle, "Pentagon "Rapid 
Reaction Media Team" for Iraq," Iraq: The Media War Plan, May 8, 2007, accessed January 14, 2018, 
http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/index.htm; Meg Sullivan. "UCLA study of satellite 
imagery casts doubt on surge's success in Baghdad." UCLA Newsroom. September 18, 2008, accessed 
January 12, 2018. http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-study-of-satellite-imagery-62852. 
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The third chapter will evaluate the tactical element of the Surge. First, the plan 
was to increase the troop level by an estimated 20,000 soldiers during the early months 
of 2007. New weapons technology and the introduction of new combat equipment, such 
as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, followed the rising troop 
levels. The goal of the troop increase was to secure the Baghdad region through 
continuous presence and remove the threat of a growing insurgency. The strategy had 
two parts. The establishment of JSS locations would be used to facilitate the training of 
the Iraqi Police and provide home bases for guarding routes through the city. 
Strategically placed COPs created secure sites to house soldiers, supply quick reaction 
forces (QRF) to repel attacks, and provide a constant presence. The second part of this 
equation was the development of local forces, such as the SOI and building 
relationships with the populace.20 
 The goal was to secure Baghdad from inside, but also stop the steady flow of 
weapons into the city. Route clearance, security checkpoints, and night raids were all 
part of this plan. By stopping surrounding threats, the US military believed they could 
control the growth of the insurgency. The perception of the strategy is that it worked, but 
the implementation of US Counterinsurgency (COIN) in Baghdad needs further 
inspection from the perspective of the soldiers who carried out the missions. Through 
the use of military and media sources, the core of this chapter will analyze the 
                                                           
20 John Pike, "Military," Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program, October 1, 2012, 
accessed January 14, 2018, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/mrap.htm; Peter R. 
Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War, 47-54. 
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effectiveness of these tactics, and whether short-term solutions achieved long-term 
goals.21 
 Each chapter offers a different approach to the Surge, while highlighting different 
areas of operations that contained specific objectives. However, each part contributes to 
the overall outcome and perception of success attributed to the Surge. As a 
consequence, the highlighting of similarities and contradictions within these claims will 
offer a fresh viewpoint about the operation. By parsing out the different components of 
the Surge, this study’s desired outcome is to emphasize what worked and what failed 
while simultaneously applying the findings to the potential use of Surge operations in 
the future. Lastly, using the voices of Surge veterans offers a different perspective of the 
operation and displays how planning and implementing strategies are not the same 
thing. Instead, the voices of soldiers will offer the why to the questions about the relative 
successes and failures of the Surge. 
 
  
                                                           
21 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24: Marine 
Corps Warfighting Publication no. 3-33.5. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 34-43; Dale 






PERCEPTIONS OF THE IRAQ WAR: EARLY ORIGINS OF THE SURGE. 
 
The Surge in Iraq was a complex mission that required significant logistical 
planning and resources. The decision to increase the number of troops on the ground 
meant identifying which units would be deployed, when they would deploy, and 
adjusting deployment lengths to compensate for the change in strategy. The plan 
required the identification of supply routes and locations for combat outposts (COP) and 
joint security stations (JSS). Understanding the level of support for such an undertaking 
involves exploration of the situations that led to the implementation of this approach. 
The years leading up to the Surge included a change in the enemy that coalition forces 
combatted, a significant increase in violence, and a long-lasting sectional divide within 
the Iraq populace that threatened the future of democracy in the region. To understand 
the events that justified the Surge, the focus will highlight the second battle for Fallujah 
in 2004, the rise of violence and the Sunni Awakening in 2005 and 2006, and the 
options given by the Iraq Study Group to counter these developments.1  
 The decline of public support for the Iraq War began in November 2004 with the 
second fight for Fallujah, also known as Operation Al-Fajr or Phantom Fury. The second 
battle of Fallujah occurred only seven months after the initial battle for the city in April. 
The re-emergence of hostiles in Fallujah signified a shift for the war in Iraq. Although the 
coalition forces won, the six-week struggle altered the future of the Iraq War in three 
significant ways. First, the enemy the US was fighting changed from members of the 
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Ba’athist Regime to a full-scale insurgency. Secondly, the loss of troops invoked fear in 
the American population about the military’s ability to win the war, which in turn 
damaged public perceptions and created an opportunity for people who opposed the 
Bush Administration's strategy in Iraq to gain traction.2   
 Fallujah is a large city located on the Euphrates River. In addition, the city is part 
of the Sunni Triangle, extending west to Ramadi, east to Baghdad, and north to Tikrit. 
With strong ties to Saddam, the de-Ba’athification of the region caused resentment from 
former military members who joined Sunni-led insurgencies. The change in the 
organizational alliance, from military to insurgency, also altered the way the enemy 
approached conflicts with coalition forces. By November 2004, Fallujah was littered with 
improvised explosive devices (IED) that added layers of difficulty to maneuvering 
through the city. These urban fighters also strategically placed weapon caches 
throughout the city and designated sniper positions. Furthermore, the motivation of this 
group no longer sought to protect a regime or leader. Instead, the purpose of fighting 
became ideological and was rooted in tribal identity and factionalism.3  
 The amount of violence following the initial contact on November 7, 2004 was 
immense. The insurgents that fought the Marines in Fallujah were better armed and 
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prepared than previous clashes between coalition forces and Hussein loyalists. The 
result of fighting a well-organized enemy was a high cost in lives and resources. An 
estimated 12,000 American troops were involved, both directly and indirectly, in the 
second fight for Fallujah. Injuries and deaths were a result of clearing the city by the 
block and encountering sniper fire, booby traps, and IEDs. Anti-personnel mines also 
came to the forefront of concerns in Fallujah. The debilitating nature of the injuries 
sustained created a push for better protection, and the number of IED attacks magnified 
the need for advanced technology to combat the enemy efficiently. The total number 
dead after the operation was 82, with another 600 injured. Loss during the campaign 
were the highest suffered since the Tet Offensive in 1968, and the parallels quickly 
circulated in the mainstream media.4  
The loss of life and the injuries sustained were not the only points of political 
disagreement. The combination of human cost and rising budget deficits also 
compounded the situation in Iraq. By the end of 2004, war-related expenditures 
averaged $7 billion dollars per month, and with Afghanistan and Iraq combined, the US 
added $412 billion more to the deficit. Questions about the ability to win the war in Iraq, 
coupled with climbing expenses and no clear exit strategy, damaged the public opinion 
of the war and the credibility of the Bush Administration to lead. Concerns about our 
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ongoing role and in the Middle East and the viability of our strategy demanded attention 
and consideration.5 
 Days before the outbreak of violence in Fallujah, George W. Bush won the 
election over John Kerry for his second term. Both candidates ran a campaign that 
emphasized staying the course in Iraq and not leaving the mission unfinished, but each 
had different approaches to accomplishing this objective. The violence during Operation 
Phantom Fury served as a tool to further heighten political division. In the face of 
criticism for the high death toll and cost, Senator Lindsey Graham addressed the conflict 
in Fallujah on Face the Nation. His position was one of optimism for the way the military 
was conducting missions in the city. He contended that “Fallujah is a turning point in the 
sense that the Iraqis are fighting for their own freedom. They're better trained, they're 
better equipped. They're willing to die for their own freedom.” Graham admitted the 
costs were high, but also argued they were necessary to secure the permanent spread 
of democracy in Iraq. During the clearing of the insurgency in Fallujah, soldiers found 
large weapons caches and torture sites that exposed the rising tensions between 
religious factions in the Sunni Triangle. Earlier that year, the military uncovered letters 
addressed to senior al-Qaeda leaders expressing a desire to exacerbate sectarian 
pressure and cause a civil war. The goal in Fallujah was to eradicate the insurgents and 
stabilize the situation in pursuit of reconciliation. In addition, the defeat of al-Qaeda in 
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Fallujah served as an example of American forces effectively clearing the path for a 
successful election in January of 2005.6 
 The opposing side of the debate focused more on the cost of the operation. As 
previously stated, the high cost in lives and money created friction among the American 
public. Additionally, the amount of collateral damage that occurred in the city of Fallujah 
caused concern. The Guardian called Operation Al-Fajr a “humanitarian catastrophe” 
while prominent members of the Democratic Party, such as John Kerry, critiqued the 
mission for lacking vision and calling for a clear exit strategy. The media questioned the 
tactics employed and condemned the immense devastation of infrastructure and loss of 
civilian life. Despite warnings from the US military weeks in advance, everyone did not 
evacuate. Fallujah, due to the direct style of warfare waged by the insurgents and the 
US military, made eliminating civilians casualties unavoidable. The weapons used also 
came under scrutiny as accusations of employing white phosphorus munitions spread in 
the United States. The Pentagon initially denied the use of such weapons in the 
aftermath of Fallujah, but by November 2005 they reversed their answer and by 2006 
were trying to justify the legality of their actions.7  
 The result of the second battle for Fallujah influenced both sides of the 
mainstream debate. For supporters, the conflict had eliminated a significant threat and 
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destroyed an enemy stronghold in the region and offered the opportunity for the United 
States to secure a political and military victory. In a panel debate on CNN, 
Representative Jane Harman argued that “I think there is a great opportunity finally after 
years of frustration, to use American power in the next four years actively to help 
achieve a peace in the region.” For critics of the war, Fallujah was an example of 
extreme force due to the use of questionable tactics and the amount of collateral 
damage. In addition, the perception of poor planning created tension as well. Senator 
Ted Kennedy claimed that “The president has lost all credibility with our allies, we’ve 
lost that support, and I believe that just because this president cannot develop a 
program to establish an Iraq that can be independent.” The discussion of how to 
proceed in Iraq, or whether the United States should stay, intensified over the next two 
years. Fallujah also magnified the sectarian violence that would become a leading factor 
for justifying the Surge in 2007. After Fallujah, the growing insurgency would not directly 
attack coalition forces in a traditional battle again. Instead, they would rely on full-scale 
guerrilla warfare.8 
The two years between the end of the conflict in Fallujah and the announcement 
of the Surge are crucial for understanding how the implementation of the Surge came to 
pass. To adequately explain the timeline, the exploration of the military and political 
ramifications of a post-Fallujah Iraq will be separated and observed by the year. The 
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military lens will focus on the intensity of the violence, while the political factors seek to 
explain the controversy surrounding continued US involvement in Iraq.  
The start of 2005 was plagued with violence, beginning with 106 US military 
deaths in the first month. The use of suicide bombers, both on foot and in vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive devices (VBIED), increased in regularity and severity creating an 
atmosphere of anxiety among both military personnel and civilians. By March the death 
toll for American soldiers in Operation Iraqi Freedom reached 1,500 and continued 
rising to 2,000 by October. The spike in violence was Sunni-led and focused on both 
coalition forces and the Shia. Violence between the two factions date back to 62 CE, but 
Baghdad was an anomaly for decades. Not only had the Sunni and Shias coexisted in 
Baghdad, but marriage between the two sects had become commonplace. However, 
the plan to remove such practices had been in motion since early 2004, and the active 
shift in ideology commenced in force by 2005. The breakdown between the two factions 
signaled desperation in the capitol and hope for cooperation between these two Iraqi 
sects was no longer viable, but due to the tactics used by the Sunni neither was the 
potential negotiations.9 
The political division also reached new heights, both in the US and Iraq, in 2005. 
The elections in January did not bring the desired level of cooperation, and the 
reasoning behind the war in Iraq was now under more intense scrutiny. While the 
government in Iraq attempted to move forward by voting for a Transitional National 
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Assembly in January, and to ratify a Constitution in October, their ability to rule was 
severely weakened by sectarian violence. The political front in the United States was 
also deteriorating in 2005. Early January revealed that the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) provided inadequate controls on funding and lost track of $8.8 billion in 
funds allocated for the development of Iraq. Other complications surrounded the 
decision to enter the war to find weapons of mass destruction and manifested 
themselves through approval ratings, support of the war, and military recruitment.10 
According to Gallup, presidential approval ratings dropped below 40 percent for 
the first time under George W. Bush, and people who viewed the war as unfavorable 
surpassed 50 percent. The most important numbers reflect in military service. For the 
first time in five years, the Army missed a monthly recruiting target in February by 27 
percent. By September the military failed to hit goals by the most significant margin 
since 1979. The National Guard fell short of their objective nine months in a row as 
numbers from injuries and deaths continued to decrease the availability of able-bodied 
soldiers. Finally, in November the Senate voted 79-19 to demand regular progress 
reports on plans to phase troops out of Iraq, followed by Democratic Representatives 
calling for a complete withdrawal.11 
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The following year began with attempts to bolster enlistment numbers, especially 
in the Army. Andrew Krepinevich, Director of the Center of Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, stated in a study for the Pentagon that, “Stretched by frequent troop 
rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has become a “thin green line” that could 
snap unless relief comes soon.” Krepinevich went on to write an article titled “How to 
Win in Iraq,” which developed a plan that laid the groundwork for what would become 
the Surge. Changing recruitment tactics and counterinsurgency measures that required 
increasing the number of combat soldiers were among his recommendations. 
Meanwhile, in Iraq, sectarian violence continued to grow. The bombing of the Golden 
Mosque in the city of Samarra, which led to the deaths of an estimated 1300 civilians, 
deepened sectarian tensions. As civilian and military deaths mounted and al-Qaeda 
denying involvement, the political climate became strained as well. 12 
 The Bush Administration began the year of 2006 on the defense of their strategy 
in Iraq. Also, the president requested $120 billion for the budget in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
an increase of $70 billion from the previous year, which revived the scrutiny over the 
missing $8.8 billion from 2005. The president continued to promise a complete victory in 
Iraq and committing troops to the region through 2009. During the campaign to regain 
support for the war, backing within the government began to crumble.  A former Central 
Intelligence Agency official, Tyler Drumheller, revealed evidence that Bush 
Administration received intelligence there were no weapons of mass destruction by a 
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high-profile Iraqi Informant before the invasion in 2003. One week later, Colin Powell 
commented in an interview on Britain's ITV that he was overruled by the President and 
military leadership when he expressed concerns that the plan did not include enough 
soldiers.  Finally, in mid-June, one month after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki oversaw 
the formation of Iraq’s first permanent constitutional government since the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, the Vice President of Iraq, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, asked for a timeline to 
pull foreign forces out by the end of 2007 as the number of American lives lost in Iraq 
surpassed 2,500.13 
 June 8, 2006, was a pivotal day for the formulation of a new plan in Iraq. Amid 
allegations, investigations, and negative reports, the US military killed Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi. With the leader of al-Qaeda dead, the United States had completed a 
substantial success on the ground, which served as a talking point for arguments 
defending the military strategy in Iraq. However, by August a New York Times update 
estimated the civilian deaths in August around 3,000 with the number of attacks still 
rising. Both General John Abizaid and General George Casey admitted that due to the 
factional violence, civil war posed the most significant threat to stability in Baghdad.14 
 The events of September changed the trajectory of the Iraq War. Due to the 
immense violence committed by al-Qaeda, local leadership in Baghdad and surrounding 
                                                           
13 Mohammed Tawfeeq, "PM: Iraqi Troops Battle-Ready in 2007," CNN, May 23, 2006, accessed 
January 4, 2018, http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/05/25/iraq.main/; Nelson Hernandez and 
Omar Fekeiki, "Iraqi Premier, Cabinet Sworn In," Washington Post, May 21, 2006, accessed January 4, 
2018, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/20/AR2006052000392.html; Daniel 
Schorn, "A Spy Speaks Out," CBS News, April 24, 2006, accessed January 30, 2018, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-spy-speaks-out-21-04-2006/. 
14 Nina Kamp, Michael O'hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz, "The State of Iraq: An Update," New York 
Times, September 30, 2006, accessed January 4, 2018, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/opinion/01ohanlon.html; Nina Kamp, Michael O'hanlon, and Amy 




cities began meeting in councils to discuss solutions to the insurgency problem. What 
emerged out of those meetings became known as the Anbar, or Sunni, Awakening. The 
significance of the awakening was the glimmer of hope, both politically and militarily, 
that the movement symbolized for the future. The Sunni sect represented the resistance 
to change after Saddam, and the separation between the Sunnis and the insurgency in 
Baghdad offered a chance for national reconciliation.15  
 Politically, the movement created a united front between Sunni leadership and 
the United States against a common enemy, al-Qaeda. The new alliance offered US 
leadership the opportunity to gain trust with locals and display a more significant 
presence within major cities like Baghdad and Ramadi. From the military perspective, 
they won an ally that had intimate knowledge of the enemy’s tactics and capabilities. 
Also, the Sunni forces who once opposed the presence of the United States were now 
working with coalition forces to eradicate insurgents. While controversy would surround 
the actions and use of groups like the Sons of Iraq (SOI) militia, they were invaluable to 
the implementation and outcome of the Surge.16  
 The SOI represented a way forward for a future independent Iraq. The existence 
of this group displayed the level of concern the United States needed to transfer the 
control of the country to Iraqi authorities. The construction of these militias depended on 
two types of people already living in Baghdad. The first group was concerned citizens 
who demonstrated the desire and ability to protect their neighborhoods. The more 
controversial members of the newly formed SOI came as a result of the Sunni 
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Awakening. As local leaders severed ties with al-Qaeda, many previous members of 
Sunni insurgent groups also switched alliances and joined forces with the US military.17  
 While insurgent violence over the course of 2006 was changing the minds of 
Sunni leadership in Iraq, the Bush Administration showed resolve towards the Iraq War 
during speeches and public appearances in the United States. Public support among 
the American people dwindled as the political climate became more divisive over 
actions and outcomes in Iraq. The ISG formed in March with the goal of finding potential 
solutions with a non-partisan panel of experts. The ISG consisted of former high profile 
political and judicial. They worked closely with members of Congress and received 
reports with proposals from expert consultants on the economy, military operations, 
security threats, and political development in Iraq.18 
 Over the course of nine months, the ISG met with a total of 44 experts who 
offered advice pro bono to assist the group in considering different areas of concern and 
reaching well-prepared conclusions. The result of these consultations was 31 policy 
papers for the ISG to review. Also, the ISG met with 177 individuals directly involved in 
the day to day decisions made in Iraq. The ISG met with government officials and 
military officers from both the US and Iraq, foreign policy specialists, business 
executives, and key figures like President Bush and Prime Minister Al-Maliki. The final 
report was distributed to the President and White House officials, followed by Congress 
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on December 6, 2006, and offered 79 specific recommendations in regards to future 
operations in Iraq.19  
 The first recommendation of the ISG concerned the domestic situation in the US. 
The ISG admitted that “this report demands a tremendous amount of political will and 
cooperation by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It 
demands skillful implementation. It demands unity of effort by government agencies. 
And its success depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political 
polarization.” Sectarian violence created the most significant threat to stability, but Sunni 
Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality 
were among the factors complicating the possibility of peace.20 
 The focal points of the suggested strategy revolved around a plan for external 
and internal factors. Externally, the ISG concluded that the United States had an 
obligation to bring long-term stability in the region. One identified obstacle was the Arab-
Israeli relationship. Other issues were the training and supplying of terrorists in the 
Middle East by Iran. The plan advised the United States to influence Syria constructively 
by encouraging the Syrian government to secure their borders and help stop the flow of 
terrorist activity into Iraq. The goal for Iran was the same, but included recognizing the 
sovereignty of Iraq and ceasing to train, fund, and support terrorist actions in Iraq and 
towards Israel.21 
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 The internal plan depended on the actions of Iraqi citizens and their willingness 
to take on the responsibility of their new democracy. The recommendation was the 
accelerated takeover of combat and policing activities against al-Qaeda. The ISG report 
warned against open-ended commitments of a significant number of troops for extended 
periods of time and suggested that continued support should rely on the Iraqi 
government's ability to meet objectives and move towards both military independence 
and national reconciliation. With or without Iraq improvements, the committee asserted 
that the long-term goal should be to significantly reduce the number of troops deployed, 
and the capacity in which they serve should move from combat operations to strictly 
training or advising roles. Lastly, by freeing up resources in Iraq, the focus could return 
to Afghanistan by increasing the number of troops and supplies available there. The 
immediate response to the report was divided. Both political sides in the US agreed that 
change in Iraq needed to take place, but that type of change should be vastly different. 
The reaction is visible through the lens of political, media, and military responses. 
  The political reaction split down party lines. Democrats believed that the ISG did 
not go far enough. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid agreed with the premise that 
change should come but claimed the people had spoken in the congressional election a 
month before: the United States should pull out of Iraq. In contrast, many Republicans 
equally believed the ISG did not go far enough by addressing potential military actions 
with neighbors in the region. Robert Gates, who was nominated for the Secretary of 
Defense directly following mid-term elections in November 2006, agreed that a direct 
approach with Iran would be beneficial for the United States and the whole Middle East. 
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However, diplomacy was not the only option that was on the table. The division visible 
in politics also manifested in the media portrayal as well. 22 
 The opinion in the media took a more dramatic tone. One argument presented 
the report as a plan to keep the United States at war in Iraq indefinitely by leaving 
deadlines for troop removal flexible, based on an Iraqi military takeover of combat 
missions. Among those upset were leaders in Iraq, who were used to highlight the 
American public’s concerns of using Iraq as a launching pad for aggressively engaging 
Iran through sanctions, and potentially war. Khalaf al-Alayyan, a Sunni Sheikh and 
parliamentarian leader of the Iraqi National Dialogue Council, claimed that “Whoever 
has a chance to look at it would realize Iraq [under the proposed agreement] would not 
just be an occupied country, but as if it were part of the United States." Also, the 
response to Iraq’s not meeting its obligations would enable the reduction of resources 
but did not mention a complete withdrawal. In addition, some Iraqi parliamentarians 
feared the proposed agreement would continue an Iraq occupation and offer a venue for 
the US to fight its battles with al-Qaeda and Iran.23 
The opposite side of the spectrum focused on the suggested negotiations with 
Iran. The logic was to make a deal with Iran that would decrease the likelihood of a 
future war. However, the plan that was proposed for negotiations did not address the 
issues of enriching uranium or the pursuit of nuclear weapons. President Bush, in a 
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speech to the Israeli Knesset, attacked supporters of a deal with Iraq by saying "We 
have heard this foolish delusion before. As Nazi tanks crossed into Poland in 1939, an 
American senator declared: 'Lord, if only I could have talked to Hitler, all of this might 
have been avoided.' We have an obligation to call this what it is - the false comfort of 
appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history." The official position of 
the Bush Administration at the end of 2006 was to maintain resolve and achieving a 
complete victory in Iraq.24 
 Not all reports of the situation in Iraq were equally divisive and driven by a 
political agenda. More moderate coverage took a long-term approach seeking 
stabilization and working towards the independent operation of a centralized 
government in Baghdad. The ISG highlighted a plethora of areas that needed 
improvement, but the primary focus was on the inability for the US to win the war 
militarily. The report stated shortcomings of the current policy, including heavy-handed 
military treatment of civilians, overzealous de-Ba'athification, and the failure to 
adequately transfer power to Iraq officials and their military. They supported the idea to 
phase out operations while transitioning to an Iraq-led assault on the insurgency. With 
Iraq forces in the lead, the government would also gain more legitimacy with its people 
and could seek reconciliation between the different factions in Iraq.25 
                                                           
24 Michael Rubin, Dancing With the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes (New York: 
Encounter Books, 2015), 2-16; Staff Writer. "A Bipartisan Path to Surrender?" The Washington Times 
(Washington, DC), December 7, 2006, accessed December 16, 2017, 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/dec/6/20061206-095730-9143r/f; Elaine Sciolino, "Nuclear 
Talks With Iran End in a Deadlock," New York Times, July 19, 2008, accessed March 01, 2018, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/world/middleeast/20nuke.html; Matthew Duss, "Down with Hitler!" 
Guardian, May 19, 2008, accessed March 1, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/19/downwithhitler. 
25 Wall Street Journal, "The Iraq Muddle Group," Wall Street Journal, December 07, 2006, 
accessed January 4, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116545660766942936; James Addison 
Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, The Iraq Study Group Report, 44-49. 
34 
 
 The military reaction to the report confirmed the importance of transferring power 
to Iraq officials, but lacked a concrete vision for a withdrawal by the United States. After 
the elections, a month before, the Bush Administration expressed the desire to consider 
new options to the complex problems in Iraq. The portions of the report that appeared in 
future planning revolved around the concept that the US had an obligation to help 
stabilize the region and protect her interests in Iraq. In the following days, the President 
and Vice-President received briefings about an alternative plan that would incorporate 
some findings of the ISG but would offer a more aggressive military solution to the 
situation. Retired General Jack Keane and Frederick Kagan, resident scholar for the 
American Enterprise Institute, oversaw directing the "Surge Study," which became 
known as the “Real Iraq Study Group” and was strongly supported by Senators Joe 
Lieberman and John McCain.26 
 The idea of a troop surge gained national recognition in an article in Foreign 
Affairs by Andrew Krepinevich in October of 2005. The concept was adopted and 
promoted by Jack Keane, who also discussed the possibility and implementation with 
General David Petraeus and General Raymond Odierno who were in the process of 
developing a new Counterinsurgency Field Manual for the Army and Marines to use in 
Iraq. Before the confirmation of General Petraeus in January of 2007, General Casey 
subscribed to the approach developed by Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, 
Commander of the Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) in 2006, which aspired to “shoot 
less and rebuild more.” Under this strategy, half of the 15 combat brigades in Iraq would 
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be pulled back and used to train Iraqi military forces to take over operations. The plan 
was to reduce the number of troops in Iraq and phase out combat missions for US 
troops. However, on December 27, 2006, a co-authored opinion piece by Keane and 
Kagan appeared in the Washington Post entitled “The Right K ind of ‘Surge.’” The 
potential policy presented by Keane and Kagan reversed the ideological foundation of 
the Chiarelli Plan and sought to increase combat troops and operations to provide 
stability in Baghdad and place the Iraq government in charge once the coalition forces 
regained control of the region.27 
 The final report was released on January 5, 2007, under the title of Iraq: A 
Turning Point. It included written statements from Senators Lieberman and McCain in 
support of the findings. The report received support from the Republicans but failed to 
unite the American people. President Bush announced on January 10, 2007, that the 
Surge laid out by Keane and Kagan would transpire, beginning with an increase of 
20,000 troops. In Congress, the accusations from the Democratic side of the aisle were 
that the Bush Administration had plans for this action all along but strategically waited 
for the right time, and that it was insincere about their willingness to consider other 
options in the Middle East.28 
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 Once the Surge was announced, planning for the strategy began immediately. 
Brigades set to be deployed in the summer were moved up to winter and spring 
departures. The cost of the rapid push for mission readiness inflated the national 
defense budget by 11 percent, reaching $481.4 billion in 2007 with a request for an 
additional $141.8 billion the following year. Additional expenses not present in the initial 
budget in early 2007 included a supplemental request of $93 billion, including $5.6 
billion to add five Army brigades and 4,000 Marines to the force in Iraq. The justification 
for the cost of the Surge was based on the violence of the previous two years. A 
combination of the reports offered by the ISG and the American Enterprise Institute 
offered expert opinions that developed into the strategy executed in Iraq. The goal was 
to reinstate the government in Baghdad: reach reconciliation between the factions in 
Iraq: create stability in the region: and protect future interests in the Middle East.29 
 The violent events that gave rise to the Surge steadily grew between 2004 and 
2007. Civilian deaths and collateral damage caused by insurgents and the efforts of the 
US military to expel them from the region led American citizens to question US 
involvement in the Middle East. The growth of guerrilla tactics stifled coalition forces and 
highlighted the need for a new strategy in Iraq. Desired plans split between pursuing an 
Iraqi controlled country through political networking that would lead to withdrawal of US 
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troops, and trying to secure a decisive military victory by staying the course. The 
combination of accusations, investigations, and findings created a divisive political 
climate in the United States that complicated the ability of key leadership to make 
decisions freely. The outcome, due to the second battle for Fallujah: the rise of 
sectarian violence: the Sunni Awakening: and the ISG was an atmosphere that was ripe 







WINNING THE IRAQ HOME FRONT: THE POLITICAL STRATEGY OF THE SURGE 
The goal of the Surge in 2007 was to rejuvenate United States’ involvement in 
Iraq and turn the tide of the war in favor of a complete victory. Claims of success for the 
operation include both military and political success in the Baghdad region. The focus of 
this chapter is to examine factors designed to promote stability. An attempt to create a 
peaceful society revolved around establishing a legitimate government and transferring 
power to official Iraqi leadership. Contributions made by the Surge vary depending on 
the focus of the research. However, three common themes emerge: a decrease in 
sectarian violence: the involvement of local groups: and increasing political capabilities 
and physical infrastructure.1 
 The key measure of success when reflecting on the political strategy in Iraq 
revolves around a decrease in sectarian violence. One of those claims was measured 
by comparing monthly statistics. For example, in the Anbar Province in November of 
2006, a total of 3,475 Iraqis and 69 US soldiers died. In November of 2008, that number 
dropped to 500 Iraqis and 12 US service members. News outlets, such as the Wall 
Street Journal and Washington Post, combined praise for the Surge and the Sunni 
Awakening with the reduction of casualties in the region by declaring “It's no longer a 
close call: President Bush was right about the surge.” Among the people credited with 
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leading the success were George W. Bush for his political will: retired General Jack 
Keane for his role in Surge plan: and General David Petraeus for a fundamental change 
in military thinking and successful implementation of the strategy. The debate over the 
Surge became central to political campaigns for the 2008 elections.2  
 Politicians expressed support for what they observed to be positive outcomes 
linked to the Surge. Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman co-wrote an editorial 
discussing the political and military victories of the Surge in January 2008. Even 
politicians who opposed the implementation of the Surge claimed a reduction in 
violence and regional stability occurred. The leadership on both sides had experience 
with this type of operation. Members of Congress who were in office during the first Gulf 
War had learned their lesson on two fronts. One, they believed that the choice to leave 
Saddam Hussein in power as a mistake. Second, the opposition to the war had cost the 
Democratic Party congressional seats in the following elections. So, while many still 
opposed long-term involvement in Iraq, the consensus is that the Surge worked in 
quelling sectarian violence in Baghdad. Historians, in the direct aftermath, also 
supported the claims made by the media and politicians.3 
 Scholarly works on the Surge have continued to highlight the reduction of 
violence as a success of the Surge. The Sunni Awakening is a crucial factor highlighted 
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in the ability of the United States to minimize deaths between rival factions in the 
Baghdad region. However, the coverage of the event concentrated on the political 
aspects and less on the destruction that led the Sunni leadership to seek out an alliance 
with coalition forces. The importance placed on uniting factions in Baghdad is accurate, 
but all potential explanations are not welcomed with equal consideration. As early as 
2008, alternate explanations have come to light, yet the existing historiography on the 
Surge does not address the evidence presented.4 
 Combat operations for the Surge started in February 2007 and employed a 
Baghdad-centric strategy. Conventional wisdom places the early stages of the Surge at 
the forefront of the reduction in violence. Nonetheless, by 2008 there was proof that 
suggested a different narrative. The University of California at Los Angeles released a 
set of satellite images of Baghdad during the time in question. UCLA combined their 
own photos with those collected by NASA’s Landsat Mapping Program, and the findings 
of this study are imperative to understanding what transpired in Baghdad in the years 
leading up to the Surge. These satellite images gauged light signatures throughout Iraq, 
but Baghdad stood out when compared with older NASA images. Other large cities, 
such as Kirkuk, Mosul, Tikrit, and Karbala increased light signatures over time as the 
operations in Iraq shifted from the invasion and removal of the Hussein regime to 
stabilization and reconstruction.5 
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Baghdad displayed a different trend. The images analyzed and released for the 
study centered on Sunni strongholds in East and West Rashid, neighborhoods which 
dropped by 80 and 57 percent, respectively by January 2007. In contrast, the night-light 
signature in the notoriously impoverished, Shiite-dominated Sadr City remained 
constant, as it did in the American-dominated Green Zone. Also, as the images 
displayed a dramatic drop in lighting for the Sunni neighborhoods, the Surge increased 
the lighting in the Shiite-dominated "New Baghdad." Lead author John Agnew stated 
“Essentially, our interpretation is that violence has declined in Baghdad because of 
intercommunal violence that reached a climax as the Surge was beginning," The 
evidence indicates that sectarian violence in Baghdad, by the start of the Surge, had 
eliminated most of the potential targets by either killing them or forcing them to seek 
refuge. In addition, the level of chaos and destruction within the Sunni-controlled 
portions of the city prevented anyone from taking up residency where others had fled. 
The findings of this research contend that a lack of targets decreased attacks between 
factions prior to the beginning of the Surge, and not because of the operation.6 
Other than one Huffington Post article, the report gained little attention from the 
mainstream media. Congress appointed an independent investigation which led to a 
widely-circulated study called “The Report of the Independent Commission on the 
Security Forces of Iraq.” The Independent Commission report claimed that the 
continued reduction in violence depended on the involvement of the US military. The 
Commission also credited the Surge with stopping the conflict between the two factions 
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in Baghdad, but also included future actions the Coalition needed to take to be 
successful long-term.  Part of that plan involved the use of local resources to solidify the 
gains made earlier that year. By using a combination of community leaders, local 
militias, and the Iraqi Police, the Commission believed the United States could emerge 
victorious in Iraq.7 
By early 2007 the US military learned that overwhelming forces did not guarantee 
a victory in Iraq. Fallujah was an example that superior firepower would not create 
stability. Instead, the choice to pursue local support was the strategy officials in the 
United States believed would produce a successful outcome for the future of Iraq. The 
first step of the new plan was to gain favor with the local sheikhs who aligned 
themselves with the United States during the Sunni Awakening. Next, through the 
influence of local leaders, the United States sought to capitalize on militias comprised of 
local men in the region. Through the execution of this plan, Baghdad would have both a 
local government and multiple security forces that could stabilize the city and take 
responsibility from US forces.8  
Leveraging tribal leadership was a topic of debate beginning in 2004. While some 
believed it was the way for reconciliation, others thought it would only deepen the 
sectional divide between factions in Iraq. Individuals who believed building relationships 
with Sunni leaders could lead to peace were focused on ending sectarian killings. One 
supporting example for this view was the withdrawal of one of the most prominent Shi’a 
militias, the ‘Mahdi Army’. Muqtada al-Sadr, a popular and influential leader of the 
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Sadrist Movement, was responsible for calling a 6-month ceasefire of its military wing in 
August 2007, and again in February 2008. Critics of using local leadership referred to 
the ongoing Shia death squads, who were small and disorganized, but who continued 
escalating the situation in Baghdad and generating a similar response from Sunni 
militias. The sheikhs served as informants, giving intelligence to US officials during 
meetings. These consultations served to discuss progress, consider modifications, and 
plan for future actions in regards to military, policing, and economic strategies the 
United States sought to implement through the Surge. Tribal leadership represented the 
way to achieve objectives, but the SOI illustrate what most have identified as a critical 
factor for success.9  
The role of the SOI during the Surge was to operate alongside US and Iraqi 
forces, while also complimenting the efforts of the Iraqi Police. Controversy around the 
use of the Sons of Iraq stemmed from their origin. The Sons of Iraq consisted of local 
men who wanted to protect their neighborhoods, but they also included former 
insurgents who switched their alliances from al-Qaeda to the United States because of 
the Sunni Awakening. The support for using the SOI was not unanimous among the 
military leadership and was identified as a potential risk to long-term peace in Baghdad. 
The New York Times discussed reservations about the strategy in 2006 by claiming 
“critics of the strategy, including some American officers, say it could amount to the 
Americans’ arming both sides in a future civil war.” Nonetheless, the use of militia 
groups during the Surge represents a successful strategy that allowed the United States 
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to gain ground over the course of the operation and create stability in the region. 
However, the resistance to this part of the strategy is essential when considering the 
overall achievements of the Surge.10 
The fear of supporting the SOI revolved around tribal conflict and the ongoing 
sectarian tension. The Washington Post contended “despite the gains, the alliance is 
still viewed with suspicion by the Shiite-led government in Baghdad, which worries local 
forces -- some of whom targeted U.S. and Iraqi soldiers before switching sides -- seek 
to threaten government authority.” In addition, Colonel Martin N. Stanton, Chief of 
Reconciliation and Engagement for Multinational Corps-Iraq, acknowledged that "there's 
a lot of distrust in the government for the Sunnis. One could almost use the word 
paranoia."  A significant factor in the decision to support the groups was the ability to 
patrol and protect their neighborhoods. A considerable concern stemmed from the 
history of the region and the possibility of what would happen when a Shia-led 
government was handed the power with a majority Sunni militia in the same city. 
Additionally, since most of the volunteers came from a background as insurgents, the 
potential for security breaches was high. The US military began collecting fingerprints, 
biometric data, and retinal scans from all volunteers to help combat the threat of 
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infiltration by local insurgents. Individuals who passed the screening started their career 
serving the community in several capacities. 11 
One accusation against the militias was that the United States persuaded the 
enemy to stop fighting through paid programs that led to the Sunni Awakening and the 
forming of the Sons of Iraq. Peter Mansoor claims, "Contrary to what some 
commentators believe, the coalition did not merely pay off the insurgents to get them to 
switch sides.” Mansoor downplays the information published by the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS). In the report, the CRS states “In the course of the ‘troop 
surge’,” U.S. commanders have taken advantage of this Awakening trend by turning 
over informal security responsibility to 91,000 former militants called “Concerned Local 
Citizens” or “Sons of Iraq” in exchange for an end to their anti-U.S. operations.” Another 
claim by the CRS is that the US was paying $16 million per month to these groups. 
General Petraeus claimed, in testimony before Congress, that “savings in vehicles not 
lost because of reduced violence – not to mention the priceless lives saved – have far 
outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts.” General Petraeus argued that the use 
of these groups saved the United States millions of dollars and lowered casualties, but 
he did not address how the costs manifested in other areas of the operation.12 
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The perception of the SOI by Surge veterans offers a different lens into their 
competency. One concern expressed was the lack of training the volunteers received 
after joining. The timeline between joining and the end of training was increasingly 
short. Kimberly Ankrom, serving with the 759th Military Police Battalion, remembers 
“they could not even load and discharge their weapons properly.” The final decision was 
not to arm the militias with US weapons, and tactical training was two or three days at 
best. From a training perspective, the volunteers were not ready for combat action and 
lacked the discipline to perform at the level needed to secure the situation in Baghdad. 
Other perspectives also highlight the weaknesses in the plan to use volunteers.13 
Soldiers who carried out combat missions offer an insight into the viability of 
relying on locals. Thomas Monk, a Bradley Gunner with the 3rd Infantry Division, 
experienced the complications that arose. He recalls “them moving into my line of fire 
and preventing me from properly defending my sector.” Another account is from a 
dismount leader, Bill Morris, who remembered “they did not follow plans or execute the 
missions correctly.” Among mistakes they made was “firing their weapons from 
locations that created confusion and put troops in a crossfire.” The lack of discipline led 
to friction between the two forces on missions, and in some instances, individuals died 
as members of the local forces found themselves in compromised positions. While 
training was a significant consideration, loyalty also caused apprehension for soldiers 
involved in combat missions as well.14 
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Responsibilities held by the militia members caused tension. Checkpoints were 
vital for controlling the flow of weapons and insurgents. Coverage for these stations was 
a combination of the Iraqi police, SOI, and US forces. Vetting the local forces was a 
requirement to serve, but the police were often recruited from other areas. Thomas 
Young, a section leader with the 3rd Infantry Division, remembered “we spent hours 
trying to get the equipment to work just to realize most of the people showing up did not 
have the correct documents or were not even eligible.” Technological deficiencies and a 
lack of support often resulted in lost data or incomplete records. Other problems were 
the number policemen that were brought in from other cities due to a lack of local 
resources.15 
 The challenges that arose were insurgents were also employed as police 
officers. Avoiding Iraqi recruits was not an option, and in some situation, soldiers also 
had to depend on them during missions. Sergeant Brian Jimenez with the 1st Cavalry 
“returned fire from a tower at a JSS. The Iraqi cops up there with us did not return fire 
and one ran away.” Other accounts, like Kenneth Raiford’s of the 3rd Infantry Division, 
did not like “having to pull guard with them,” and recalled that “they slept on duty all of 
the time.” Despite the local militia’s reputation in the media for taking combat 
responsibilities from Coalition forces, the reality for soldiers reveals increased danger 
and stress due to ill-equipped or corrupt members of the security forces.16 
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Documentation about the specific targeting of individuals who changed sides 
during the Anbar Awakening offers a glimpse into problematic areas of the operation. 
While overall attacks on Iraqi civilians was down by 2008, the number of rocket attacks 
and suicide bombers had slowly risen. Dan Malubag worked on security details with the 
3rd Infantry Division that escorted high ranking officials, both civilian and military, to 
meetings with the sheikhs during the Surge. He recalled the awkwardness associated 
with the gatherings and the level of discomfort by both Americans and Iraqis. He stated 
that “our meetings were more about sizing each other up than listening.” During the 
summer and fall of 2007, 1-15 Infantry suffered three separate suicide-bomber attacks 
during the meetings and suffered the loss of multiple Iraqi security forces designated to 
protect tribal leadership and family members of the councilmen. Direct targeting of the 
wives and children of the Sons of Iraq further exacerbated issues of trust and caused 
some members of the councils to negotiate with insurgents or have a complete falling 
out with US operations in Baghdad.17 
The use of Iraq security forces also created additional risk for US soldiers. 
Individuals sought after by al-Qaeda drew extra attention to everyday missions and 
involved US forces in tribal conflicts. Jimenez recollected a former member of a Sunni 
group who allied with al-Qaeda, but then became a leader of his local security group. 
During missions with this individual, they continued “receiving small arms or sniper fire 
every time,” which led to the leader “being shot on two different occasions and 
surviving.”  Despite the targeting of militia groups by insurgents, support for their use 
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continued. The best arguments made for the use of the Sons of Iraq was the rapid 
growth, sheer numbers, and cost. A common defense of the decision is to point out the 
amount of resources it would take for the United States to match the rapid accumulation 
of volunteers in Baghdad. While it is true that the US Army did not possess the 
manpower to generate the same type of operations, the defense of the strategy does 
not consider the additional threat to US forces assumed by using and funding former 
insurgents.18  
The goal for stabilization reached to all aspects of life. The economy was an 
essential factor in a stable Baghdad, and eventually Iraq. The brutal reign of the al-
Qaeda insurgencies had hindered the citizens in the region from day-to-day activities 
including the production, buying, and selling of goods. Desperation and fear are an 
essential part of individuals supporting an oppressive regime. Conventional wisdom for 
curbing local support for an insurgency is to improve the standard of living. US officials 
sought to promote normalcy through route clearance, eliminating the rebel presence, 
and gaining trust in the region. To win in Iraq, President Bush argued the United States 
must “assist the Iraqi government in establishing the foundations for a sound economy 
with the capacity to deliver essential services”. The Sons of Iraq became a critical 
component of winning over the local populace and creating an environment for the Iraqi 
government to take control. 19   
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The restoration of law and order was the primary ambition of the Surge and the 
justification for the use of the Sons of Iraq. Coalition leaders believed that the constant 
presence of armed community members backed by the US military would restore 
confidence and stimulate the local economy. Reports of the operation claim that the 
Surge was successful on the economic front for two reasons. First, people felt safe to 
resume life in the business sector. General Rick Lynch, Commanding General of MNC-
I, referred to the new businesses springing up and the rapid growth of the market in 
Baghdad in an interview. He stated that “Roads that were laced with IEDs a year ago 
are now littered with thriving markets.” Historian Dale Andradé explained the success as 
a cycle. The violence that transpired in the region led to the need for local security, 
which created jobs, and increased the flow of new funds into the local economy. This 
explanation is the most common but is not without critics.20  
Other views of the event do not deny that the economy grew, but rather that it 
was a natural occurrence and short-lived. Retired Colonel Douglas MacGregor, author 
of Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights, is among the top 
officials that support this view. Instead of the Surge causing the growth, MacGregor 
argues that the aligning of tribal groups in different regions of the city contributed to 
developments in Baghdad. The oppressive nature of al-Qaeda caused the Anbar 
Awakening and the violence that continued eventually cleansed the factions to the point 
of exhaustion. After all of this transpired, the Surge began which, in turn, followed the 
segregation of neighborhoods. The intensity of the operation continued to soften the 
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tactics of al- Qaeda and drive out lingering remnants of rebel fighters. Business boomed 
in these sectors between members of the same sect, but did not spread out to a 
citywide economy. Instead, new marketplaces were built and supported by members of 
the same group in a small area. Colonel McGregor contends that ‘Segregation works’ is 
effectively what the U.S. military is telling you. We have facilitated, whether on purpose 
or inadvertently, the division of the country. We are capitalizing on that now.” So the 
economic growth was not one solidified effort, but rather the result of multiple localized, 
independent movements that lacked the spirit of reconciliation the US and Iraq 
leadership desired.21 
The Surge also sought to address humanitarian needs in Baghdad. While the 
Sons of Iraq were present for some of the operation, aspects of the strategy rested on 
US forces. The purpose was to project strength in the city, but also served as an 
attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Administering aid to the war-
torn region also served as an excellent opportunity to display a benevolent spirit after 
two previous years of brutal military action. The objective of this civil strategy was to 
garner favor through offering medical help, rebuilding infrastructure, and improving the 
standard of living.22 
The invasion in 2003 significantly damaged the healthcare system in Iraq. With 
the US aiming at winning hearts and minds, while simultaneously bringing stability to the 
region, the health of the citizens in Iraq was imperative. One early focus was children 
with debilitating diseases and deformities. Some veterans of the Surge were involved 
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with the transportation and security of the victims to airfields where they were flown to 
the Green Zone for intensive medical conditions, operations, and physical therapy. 
While some good transpired through humanitarian missions, they also carried a high-
risk factor by exposing US soldiers to dangerous situations while in charge of individuals 
who slowed operations. The United States was able to help some individuals, but 
stability remained an issue. Charlotte F. Blatt, a fellow in the War and Peace Studies 
Program at Dartmouth College, summarized that “our inability to remain sufficiently 
engaged in Iraq added to the failure of providing accessible potable water, healthcare, 
and telephone services.” Consistently providing for the needs of the population in 
Baghdad required resources, but was equally hindered by the destruction in the city.23 
Another issue that arose was the safety of people who received help from 
Coalition forces. Sean Kane was part of a mission that pulled security while local 
citizens attempted to get electricity and running water in working order. After multiple 
days of trying, some houses were repaired. The following missions were similar, but 
located in a different part of the city. He recollects “as soon as our platoons moved out 
the insurgents could freely move again and those people we helped had their homes 
destroyed or worse.” In this scenario two factors were at play. First, people who were 
visibly seen either helping or being helped by US forces became a target. Second, 
infiltration into local groups by insurgents made it more difficult to complete any type of 
mission without participants being singled out later.24 
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Government buildings served as sites for routine medical treatment such as 
checkups, immunizations, or treatment of minor ailments. Scout and infantry units were 
dispatched to secure and protect the site during the humanitarian operations. Such 
missions frequently faced resistance, as insurgents directly attacked medical staff, 
women, and children.  By assaulting charitable events, the insurgents effectively stifled 
attempts to help, but also discouraged citizens in Baghdad from accepting US aid. 
Soldiers who experienced these attacks often reflected on the situation negatively. Josh 
Berner was a Specialist with the 3rd Infantry Division. His recollection of medical 
missions consisted of “being defenseless in dangerous regions of the city,” and 
“creating civilian targets by helping the people who came out.” The locations selected 
tended to be in high population areas and surrounded by tall buildings. Missions quickly 
shifted from helping civilians to a combat environment. Due to the reliance on air 
coverage, large amounts of collateral damage was created, which further complicated 
the US relationship with civilians. Other parts of the strategy sought to balance out the 
collateral damage by simultaneously focusing on rebuilding efforts.25 
The process of revamping old and building new infrastructure in Baghdad 
became a focus of the operation. During the Surge, an estimated $3.6 billion went 
towards rebuilding damaged parts the city and covering the cost of security forces. A 
significant amount of money spent was meant to ensure trust among the local populace 
and create jobs so the Iraqi men could have alternate choices to joining insurgent 
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groups. One example mentioned by previous authors was north of Baghdad. A prison, 
being built large enough for 3,600 inmates, was constructed to house individuals 
working to continue the destabilization of the region.  In addition, the prison would 
create jobs while being built, and secure opportunities for future generations by 
generating a viable source of income. The contracts were initially awarded to Parsons 
Engineering Corporation in 2004, but new funds were allocated to complete the prison 
in 2007. However, the prison was handed over to the Ministry of Justice in late 2007 
who refused to finish, occupy, or provides security for the site due to a lack of 
resources. An estimated $40 million went towards the prison with over $1 million worth 
of materials left untouched in the desert.26   
Other examples of the US trying to stabilize the region through nation-building 
policies sought to increase the quality of life for the people in Baghdad. Education 
became a concern among US officials and local leaders, but the disrepair of 
infrastructure made civil development difficult. Electricity became a luxury amenity most 
citizens in Baghdad lacked access to. Another significant obstacle to helping the people 
in the city included resolving the sanitation crisis. Running water was not available to 
most after the initial invasion, and resulted in streets that were full of trash and raw 
human sewage. The United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported 
that “efforts to fix the country’s municipal pipes and treatment plants – damaged by the 
impact of a decade of sanctions and war – have been seriously undermined by chronic 
under-investment, frequent power shortages, lack of qualified personnel, illegal water 
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tapping and acts of sabotage.” Resistance to the presence of the United States, 
combined with corruption in leadership left Baghdad in disrepair. 27   
The push to offer access to electricity had initial success, but as time continued 
the task grew in difficulty. The Ministry of Electricity in Iraq, in addition to millions of 
dollars in support from the United States, was able to get power back to multiple parts of 
the city at first. The invasion contributed to the initial damage to the infrastructure, but 
continuous conflict prevented repairs, which left much of the city in a dilapidated state. 
US soldiers recall seeing people splicing into main power lines, some fatally injured, in 
an attempt to route power to their houses and businesses. However, the low hanging 
lines also caused safety hazards for soldiers in gunner hatches on top of military 
vehicles. Anthony Burkhardt remembers his gunner “being knocked unconscious and 
falling out of the hatch after being electrocuted.” Michael McIntire was another gunner 
that got electrocuted during a mission. When asked about the event he remembers 
“rotating the turret, the next thing I knew I was laying in the floor of the MRAP with my 
crew standing over me.” By August the situation had deteriorated due to rebel groups 
still in the region. Continuous attacks on electrical stations shut down entire 
neighborhoods. Other complications came from the summer heat and the overload air 
condition units placed on the already strained system. By the end of 2007, rolling 
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blackouts were occurring throughout the city. Unfortunately, the damage created by a 
lack of electricity was much worse than depriving air conditioning in a desert climate.28   
The issue of water had always been a problem in Iraq but was increased 
dramatically through the ongoing war. In 2008, the World Bank estimated the water 
systems in Iraq needed an additional $14.4 billion to restore to acceptable working 
condition. By this time the US had already spent over $8 billion on the construction and 
remodeling of water treatment plants in Iraq, with an estimated 30 percent of the funds 
allocated to the Baghdad region. Part of the civil strategy of the Surge was to alleviate 
the suffering of citizens in the city by improving sanitation and providing access to 
potable drinking water. The accounts that view the humanitarian efforts during the 
Surge tend to focus on the plan to fix the problem instead of the outcome.29  
The first challenge was keeping the plants running on a consistent basis. 
Problems surrounding sewage removal and water distillation had mounted since the 
invasion of 2003. Repairing damaged plants that survived, and re-building the ones 
destroyed began in late 2005. In 2007, the Bush Administration reinvigorated the 
urgency of completing the water treatment plants to help facilitate stability. 
Nevertheless, the lack of electricity prevented the plan from developing. By 2008, less 
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than 40 percent of the population had access to potable water and the low points in the 
city had become cesspools.30  
Servicemen in the Baghdad area experienced the issue firsthand, recalling the 
difficulties it posed for operations in the city. Soldiers handed out life-straws to families 
to provide a temporary solution to the water shortage. Other complications were the 
condition of the streets in the cities. Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) and High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) mired in the sludge, which slowed down 
mission speed, and creating a security risk. Also, the efficiency of performing route 
clearance, dismount patrols, and raid missions suffered due to the condition of the 
roads. Bruce Chambers, a driver with 1-15 Infantry, recalled a situation where “the road 
collapsed and my Bradley sank over the tracks in a ditch of water runoff and human 
shit.” Eric Blackburn also had problems when “it was impossible to drive down certain 
roads in the city and we had to turn around in tight areas, which made us a sitting 
target.” In a cyclic pattern, these problems contributed to each other. With the road 
system in disrepair, security became more difficult, making securing the electrical plants 
impossible. Furthermore, due to the lack of electricity and security, the city fell into 
further ruin. The last effort was to create wealth that could allow the Iraqi people to 
accomplish these tasks themselves.31 
The final factor, and perhaps the most important, for contributing to infrastructure 
reconstruction involved oil. Before the invasion in 2003, the oil industry in Iraq was 
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nationalized entirely, giving Saddam Hussein total control of the resource. After the 
removal of Hussein, the United States took over energy production in Iraq. In 2007, 
George W. Bush pushed for new legislation that would promote “investment, national 
unity, and reconciliation.” These became known as the Iraq Hydrocarbon Laws, which 
encouraged foreign investment, but also ceded significant amounts of control to 
corporations located outside of Iraq. The goal was to revitalize the economy, create 
wealth, and seek to find common ground for the three main factions in Iraq. However, 
the response was different than anticipated.32 
The suggestion received stiff resistance from the population and officials. Usama 
al-Nujeyfi, a key leader in Parliamentary Energy Committee, walked out in protest. The 
fear was that the new laws would cede too much power to global interests and stifle the 
growth of the country in the future. Despite discontent with the program, the pressure 
persisted. With the prospect of continued foreign military occupation dimming as 
elections loomed in the U.S. and Iraq, the oil companies pursued a different approach in 
2008. Corporations, with the help of the Coalition, by-passed Parliament and dealt 
directly with the top leadership. Iraqi lawmakers fought back but lost. The outcome was 
a system that offered much less security for the people of Iraq and centrally 
consolidated the power within the government. Not only did the strategy end up 
returning the oil industry to a nationally controlled entity, but further divided the Sunni, 
Shia, and Kurdish leadership.33 
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Despite glimpses of success for domestic policy in Iraq, the celebration was 
short-lived. Most journalists, historians, and military officials place the height of military 
operations for the Surge in the summer through the early winter of 2007. Violence 
reached new lows in mid-spring of 2008. As the dust appeared to be settling, the US 
began efforts to hand over power to officials in Iraq. In 2008, the continued logistical 
requirements, including pay, for the SOI was placed in the hands of the government in 
Iraq, and by November most of the volunteer force had not received payment and had 
reverted to insurgent activities. On December 11, in a meeting between Kurdish and 
Arab leaders about reconciliation, a Sunni suicide bomber killed 57 people in Kirkuk. 
Two weeks later a car bomb killed 22 civilians, and in early January a suicide bomber 
killed 32 people at a reconciliation lunch in Baghdad. With the unifying threat of al-
Qaeda gone the situation showed no signs of solidified support behind the Iraq 
government, and once again moved towards civil war.34   
Political policy during the Surge has received praise but has also been subject to 
more criticism than the military strategy. Due to the dynamics in Baghdad, needs were 
visible, but solutions were hard to accomplish. The sectarian violence left a path of 
destruction, but guiding leadership towards reconciliation was involved. The use of local 
groups was imperative handing power back to the Iraq government, but made settling 
factional differences more difficult. Finally, infrastructure was a glaring issue but solving 
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the problem presented further complications. People needed electricity, but rebel 
groups gained control of the grids and put pressure on supporters of the coalition 
forces. Without adequate power, providing water to the local populace was impossible, 
and the absence of both resources left stability out of reach in Baghdad as the quality of 
life decreased over time. The Surge, from a domestic point of view, highlights 
deficiencies in the previous approach of the Bush Administration in Iraq. Nonetheless, 
the remedies applied to Iraq during the Surge lacked the proper planning and did not 
yield the results needed to create a united Iraq.35 
  
                                                           
35 Simon, Steven. "The Price of the Surge." Foreign Affairs. July 08, 2014. Accessed February 09, 
2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2008-05-03/price-surge; Shamoo, Adil E., and Bonnie 







A CHANGE IN APPROACH: THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE SURGE. 
Thus far, the exploration of the Surge has focused on the events that led to the 
operation and the domestic strategy employed to stabilize Baghdad. The goal of this 
chapter is to investigate the approach that shaped combat missions carried out by the 
United States during the Surge. Military achievements during the Surge are praised as 
the most successful part of the operation and has received credit for changing the 
operational art of counterinsurgency. While the large-scale plan for the Surge is multi-
faceted, the overall desired outcome manifests itself through three distinct phases. The 
objective in Baghdad was designed to allow US forces to clear, control, and retain 
progress made in the city while working towards a long-term transfer of power to the 
government in Iraq.1  
 When looking at the efforts to clear Baghdad of insurgent presence, the first 
ingredient was more service members in Iraq. Retired General Jack Keane, in his co-
authored report about a Surge in Iraq, called for an increase of 21,500 troops. By March 
2007, the number of military personnel in Iraq was 152,000, and President Bush called 
for an additional 7,000 bringing the Surge total to 28,500. The idea behind the increase 
was to adequately man regions in Baghdad and overwhelm the enemy by implementing 
the new counterinsurgency plan developed by General David Petraeus and his staff at 
Fort Leavenworth. With the influx of troops, US officials believed they could secure the 
region through a continuous presence, thus winning the support and trust of the local 
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population while the new approach would provide the opportunity to defeat the 
insurgency. With the confidence of the locals and the stabilization of the region, the 
transfer of control to Iraq officials could take place.2 
Media and academic coverage of the military strategy in Iraq focuses on 
operations and not the logistical side of the action. Logistical planning for the Surge was 
short-sided, and focused on moving troops and equipment quickly. There is no dispute 
in regards to the efficiency of getting the troops to the Middle East, but questions about 
the quality of preparation for the combat mission arose. Another concern was that the 
prescribed number of additional troops would still not be enough. Many of the soldiers 
sent were either in their desert training phase required before deployment for their unit’s 
combat readiness certification or had not yet undergone training. Several combat 
readiness standards created concerns as the Surge unfolded. The main areas of 
consideration include the equipment many units deployed, combined with concerns 
about the physical and mental condition of the soldiers.3 
Issues with the equipment revolved around two factors. First, a concern with the 
rapid deployment of troops was providing the proper gear needed for success. Military 
members recall deploying with two or three different camouflage patterns in a single 
platoon, and sometimes on one individual. The issue was soldiers standing out from the 
group, which could make them a more likely target. The Army began the switch from the 
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previous Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) to the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) in 2005 for 
garrison use. Other patterns in circulation were the Desert Battle Dress Uniform 
(DBDU). The situation for some soldiers was ACU uniforms mixed with BDU and DBDU 
combat gear. Devlin Johnson, a Staff Sergeant with the 3rd Infantry Division, recalls 
being “deployed with a woodland camo kevlar cover, a desert camo vest, and ACU 
MOLLE (Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment) gear.” Josh Berner, a member 
of the same platoon, had all ACU equipment “except for a woodland MOLLE “and the 
older version “ALICE (All-purpose Lightweight Individual Carrying Equipment) 
rucksack.” However, by the late summer of 2007, this problem was remedied as combat 
missions continued. The other significant issue with equipment was the quality of body 
armor issued to US soldiers. The Pentagon released a report in 2006, with little 
coverage, which stated some of the fatalities in Iraq resulted from the faulty vests given 
to military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan and the protective armor used on combat 
vehicles. The United States addressed the deficiencies in the gear, but the timing of the 
Surge predated the solution.4 
American soldiers deployed for the summer operations in 2007 were among the 
first to receive the up-armored equipment. Reactive for HMMWV and Bradleys were 
issued in Kuwait and mounted before loading vehicles on the railhead for Baghdad. The 
reactive armor contained two metal plates, with explosives in between, which would 
                                                           
4 H.R. Rep. No. 110 Congress-V. 153 pt. 3 at 4030-4048 (2007); Devlin Johnson. emailed to 
Matthew Buchanan, Perry, GA, August 9, 2016; Joshua Berner. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, 
Tahlequah, OK, November 7, 2016; Michael Moss, "Pentagon Study Links Fatalities to Body Armor," The 
New York Times, January 07, 2006, accessed February 02, 2018, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/07/politics/pentagon-study-links-fatalities-to-body-armor.html; Greg 
Mitchell, Joseph L. Galloway, and Bruce Springsteen, So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, The 
Pundits, and The President Failed on Iraq (New York: Union Square Press/Sterling Pub., 2008), 200-242. 
65 
 
repel shrapnel from roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). However, 
many of the units already in place did not receive the update until the fall, after much of 
the intense combat had subsided. The failure to sync this technological advancement, 
initially created in the late summer of 2006, with the start of the mission displays 
differences between the plan presented and realistic expectations on the ground. In 
addition to trying to secure combat vehicles the military already possessed, they also 
began adding new technology by the fall of 2007.5 
The beginning of the Surge led to technological growth for the US military, but 
the insurgency was evolving their tactics as well. New styles of IEDs in Baghdad 
created a panic among military personnel and raised concerns at home as the recruiting 
struggle for the Army and National Guard continued. Insurgents in Baghdad stopped 
relying on deep-buried IEDs to hinder movement. Instead, they switched to a style of 
weapon known as an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP). The design of these 
weapons appeared in World War II and are as simple as they are deadly. Built in a 
cylindrical shape, the construction of EFP's consisted of scrap metal. Insurgents would 
mount a concave metal disc to a metal pole and attach copper or brass balls, which 
resembled a shotgun slug, facing towards the target. The metal slugs would project at 
over nine thousand feet per second for the first forty-five feet. The new reactive armor 
was penetrated with ease, creating another problem in need of a solution.6   
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The first attempt at stopping the EFP mines began in 2007. General Dynamics 
won the contract to design the new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. In May, 
Congress authorized an additional $4 billion in funding to have them produced by Force 
Protection Industries. By the winter of 2007, the US had invested an estimated $50 
billion to provide 27,000 new MRAP vehicles for Iraq and Afghanistan. Three issues 
quickly surfaced with the new vehicles. The design of the MRAP allowed the operation 
of weaponry from the inside of the vehicle through a digital Commonly Remote 
Operated Weapon Station (CROWS). Unfortunately, the system was not perfected in 
time and gunners were fifteen feet off the ground when in the gunner’s hatch manually 
operating the weaponry. Low hanging electrical wires and makeshift structures in 
Baghdad made using the vehicle difficult. The second problem soldiers had with the 
MRAP was all the canals and rivers in Baghdad. Between the difficulty of escaping the 
vehicle and the amount of weight that body armor added several soldiers drowned in 
early 2008. Lastly, a lack of padding on the inside of the vehicle created unanticipated 
problems. While soldiers were protected from the blast outside, many were severely 
injured being inside of all-metal vehicles during the explosions. Between the late arrival 
of the MRAP, and multiple deficiencies, the response to the release of the new vehicle 
did not achieve the desired success. 7  
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Another problem with the new strategy was the ramp-up of deployments. This 
came at a significant cost for combat troops. The worst cases saw units deployed six 
months ahead of schedule. Faster deployment time meant less recovery time for 
soldiers on rotation and decreased valuable training time. With the announcement of the 
Surge, many soldiers were forced to redeploy back to the Middle East without being 
home for more than a year. Another problem with the change in deployment date was 
the inability for those combat units to reach full combat strength, which forced them to 
deploy with a lack of manpower. The stress created by an early deployment and lack of 
manpower only compounded the seriousness of the mission at hand. In addition, once 
in Kuwait, many soldiers recall being told that their deployments would be extended 
from one year to 14-16 months depending on their role and the success of the mission.8 
As the Surge hit full stride in the summer of 2007, the condition of US troops 
became a topic of debate. In addition to fatigue, the overall motivation for completing 
the mission came into question. One study found that “Despite eroding public support 
for the Iraq war, troop morale remains high. Experts warn that could change as U.S. 
forces get further bogged down in Iraq.” Others supported this conclusion and took it 
one step further by blaming the waning support on political posturing and rival media 
sources, and not the real sentiment of the American people. Per Oliver North, a Fox 
News war correspondent in Iraq, “those who believe that the campaign in Iraq is a lost 
cause better not tell that to the soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division — they think they’re 
winning.” He continued by stating that “These troops ought to know — many of them are 
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here on their third, year-long tour of duty in Iraq.” While the argument made by these 
sources supported the view that troops remained motivated, they also admit that these 
soldiers were caught up in a rapid cycle of deployments.9 The level of troop resolve was 
highly contested during the Surge, but the individuals on the ground have a different 
perspective on the topic.  
Exhaustion is a common word used by veterans discussing the combat 
conditions in Iraq during the Surge. There was a mixture of individuals who were on 
their first, second, and even third deployment to Iraq since 2003. Instead of reflecting on 
morale, the focus is more on the ability to accomplish the objective efficiently and the 
outcome of the mission. They recognize that without Iraq there was still a war in 
Afghanistan that made deployments unavoidable. However, the situation in Baghdad 
was made more difficult due to the lack of combat readiness. During the spring and 
summer of 2007, the regular rotation for soldiers in Baghdad was grueling. Anthony 
Wright discussed clearing operations and the difficulties involved. He recollected 
“clearing the city street by street in heat like I had never felt,” and “catching hell every 
step of the way.” Thomas Monk remembered “trying to stay hydrated during missions,” 
and “struggling to stay awake.” The pace of the missions, summer heat, and lack of 
sleep made the soldiers ability to stay hydrated, healthy, and alert more difficult.10 
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 A typical field rotation was between five and eight days, and twelve to forty-eight 
hours off before the next missions resumed. When on missions, sleep was scarce, but 
so was downtime. Cody Watson was a dismount with the 3rd Infantry Division, and 
remembers “sleeping two or three hours a night” during missions. In addition, they also 
“only got an hour or two of sleep at a time” because of “counterattacks and guarding 
battle positions.” When soldiers were not on a mission, the responsibilities shifted to 
servicing vehicles, cleaning weapons, repairing uniforms, catching up on personal 
hygiene, and, if needed, pulling guard shifts. The lack of rest created a high risk of 
operational exhaustion, which damages the individual's ability to be alert and function at 
the highest level, often leading the potential for fatal mistakes. Bill Piper recalled 
dismounted patrols becoming “sloppy” with soldiers lacking “situational awareness and 
forgetting training by stepping on trash, which could be potential anti-personnel 
mines.”11 Long missions and a lack of sleep threatened the life and health of the troops, 
but this is overlooked in media coverage of the Surge. Instead, the essential part of the 
claim to success for the operation in Baghdad includes two significant military actions.  
Operation Phantom Thunder was among the most extensive operations ever 
carried out in Iraq. For many people in the United States, June 16, 2007 and this 
mission marked the beginning of the Surge due to the increase of media coverage. In 
addition, Phantom Thunder also set the tone for the future operations carried out during 
the Surge. The objectives of this military action were to attack the al-Qaeda strongholds 
in the city and use the opportunity to display military superiority to the locals. Phantom 
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Thunder was a quick-hitting operation that covered ground quickly. Lasting less than 
two months, coalition forces and the Iraqi military cleared the city of Baghdad with 
additional activity pouring out to the north, south, and west.12  
    The operation received many accolades from both military and civilian reporting. 
A key supporter of the Phantom Thunder was Lt. General Raymond T. Odierno, 
commander of the MNC-I. According to General Odierno, the mission’s successes 
included 6,702 detainees, 1,196 dead insurgents, and 419 wounded enemy personnel. 
Combined forces also killed or captured 382 high-value targets. Other sources claimed 
the success involved killing or driving out the bulk of insurgent forces in the Baghdad 
beltway, allowing US forces to secure the cities perimeter.  Analysts believed that this 
mission offered a path forward for both security and peace, but the reality soon set in 
that further action would be needed to ensure success and create an environment 
manageable without significant US military presence.13 Phantom Thunder was a short 
operation that ended on August 14 and foreshadowed the second significant military 
action that defined the Surge. 
 Operation Phantom Strike began on August 15, 2007. The objectives of this 
mission were the same as Operation Phantom Thunder, which was to remove the threat 
inside the city, but the approach was different. Instead of an intense push for results, 
Phantom Strike created a strategy for long-term damage to any insurgency operating 
inside the region. The operation was meant to serve as the transition from clearing the 
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city to controlling the development and rebuilding in Baghdad. After Phantom Thunder 
attacked strongholds, Phantom Strike aimed at preventing future infiltration of enemy 
personnel and preventing the flow of weapons. One important objective of the Surge 
was to reduce the number of US troop involvement in combat missions. This portion of 
the operation was meant to increase the responsibilities of the Iraq forces. The Iraqi 
Army began conducting missions with US forces serving in a supportive role. In 
addition, the SOI performed continuous patrols in their neighborhoods while also 
receiving more responsibility with the expulsion of local insurgents and locating enemy 
armament. While both operations yielded desired results, much of their success 
occurred before the summer of 2007.14 
 The Anbar, or Sunni Awakening and the Baghdad Security Plan appear in the 
coverage as separate maneuvers from the Surge, or at least as a precursor. However, 
much of what the US military accomplished during Operations Phantom Thunder and 
Phantom Strike is in direct correlation with the gains made by these two factors. The 
sectarian violence led to the decrease of the Sunni population and the acceptance of 
insurgent groups in the Baghdad beltway. The oppressive nature of al-Qaeda eventually 
led to Sunni groups switching sides and allying with the US. Shortly after the Sunni 
Awakening, the US and militia groups began implementing the Baghdad Security Plan. 
In January 2007, the United States started seeking out places to establish Combat 
Outposts (COP). The new COP locations would allow the US to display a constant 
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presence in the city and encourage the local population to move forward with a sense of 
security. Other operational changes were the establishment of Joint Security Stations 
(JSS), which would allow US and Iraqi forces to watch crucial areas and serve as a 
launching point for night patrols in different neighborhoods. Finally, the plan for security 
established checkpoints throughout Baghdad to help control the flow of munitions into 
the city.15 
 While the Baghdad Security Plan achieved some of its objectives, such as 
establishing a continuous presence in the city and tightening security, the plan also had 
ramifications that were not intended. Combat outposts offered a place for soldiers to live 
and stage missions within the neighborhoods they were patrolling. The location of the 
outposts allowed the completion of Surge objectives, but also made soldiers more 
vulnerable. The defensibility of the bases increased with time, but initially they were 
highly susceptible to sniper fire, rocket attacks, and even vehicle-bound explosives. Eric 
Blackburn was injured by a grenade while pulling guard. He stated that “the front line of 
defense was Iraqi soldiers who were not paying attention,” and “allowed a younger 
individual to lob a grenade over the barriers.” He also claimed another factor was heat 
and fatigue, and that “the explosion happened before any of us knew what was 
happening.” Soldiers, in the middle of the summer in Iraq, were required to wear body 
armor anytime they were not inside the structure where they lived, causing further 
discomfort, fatigue, and susceptibility to the heat.16  
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Other problems caused by these outposts included the perception among the 
local population. The location of the new bases was frequently private property, and 
sometimes historical structures. For example, COP Blackfoot in Baghdad was a 
Catholic church before the combination of the invasion and sectarian violence drove its 
members from the city. The library at this cathedral contained documents fundamental 
to the history of Catholicism in Iraq. The confiscation of this property not only created 
feelings of resentment for Iraqi Catholics, but also damaged hopes of reconciliation 
inside the region due to a failure to recognize the historical and cultural significance of 
sites in the city.17  
 Establishing new JSS locations, combined with checkpoints, were another facet 
of the plan to secure Baghdad. Checkpoints were used to control traffic and slow the 
land-based movement of weapons. The US military also established temporary 
positions up and down the Tigris River to combat the movement of arms by water. JSS 
sites had multiple functions that were essential to the stabilization of the region. First, 
combined with the COP locations, the sites gave an additional presence in the city with 
hopes of protecting and building trust with the citizenry. Both U.S. and Iraqi forces 
manned the sites. Also, many were centrally located with tall towers so individuals could 
guard sectors 24-hours a day and have a good vantage point to prevent the placement 
of IEDs on major routes. While the JSS component did achieve some of the objectives 
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desired, they also created concerns among service members and made the situation 
more dangerous for the US and Iraqi personnel.18 
 The structure of the JSS compounds, typically in the middle of the city with tall 
towers, made them susceptible to attacks. Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), small 
arms fire, and car bombs were the most common forms of attack. The soldiers who 
occupied these locations had legitimate concerns about the Iraqi Police. They did not go 
through the same vetting process as the Sons of Iraq, and many of them commuted 
from other regions without being subjected to the same level of investigation. Sedrick 
Brown, a Platoon Sergeant with the 3rd Infantry, claimed that “the police were different,” 
because “we had a common objective with locals, but policemen were only in it for the 
highest pay.” Other concerns revolved around the checkpoints. US troops became 
sitting targets for car bombs due to their placement and lack of resources. Eric 
Blackburn, when asked about the aptitude of the Iraqi Police, concluded “they either 
didn’t pay attention or just didn’t care.” Both the JSS and checkpoints were in place by 
the end of January 2007 but were not fully operational until August. During that time, 
multiple preventable attacks occurred, including a truck bomb carrying chlorine gas.19 
Data supports the claim of a reduction of violence, but there are two popular 
explanations of why. Both interpretations explore the conflict between religious sects, 
but neither addresses the victims from types of brutality. 
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 Throughout the Surge, violence towards US personnel reached new heights. 
News media reported in December that 2007 had become the deadliest year thus far of 
the war in Iraq. The highest number of soldier deaths in Iraq was in 2004 with 849, but 
2007 ended with a total of 904 soldiers lost during operations. New technology acquired 
by the insurgent groups allowed them to cause more destruction with a single hit and 
intensified in the early summer due to a lack of equipment to combat the new 
developments. The US forces effectively cleared the city but large numbers of 
insurgents fled the city before being killed or captured. The beginning of fall 2007 
witnessed a significant decrease in attacks towards the US forces. However, as 
insurgents began to return to the region those attacks rekindled as the year came to an 
end.20  
 Another demographic that suffered during Surge operations were civilians. The 
death and displacement of civilians during the Surge is a topic that does not receive 
much recognition. The discussion that emerges from the loss of innocent life revolves 
around sectarian violence or is grouped in with collateral damage. May was one of the 
deadliest months of the Surge for any group. The US suffered a loss of 126 soldiers, but 
the Iraq civilian casualties reached 2,155. By the end of the year, the number of civilian 
casualties reached 18,610. Prior to 2007, the level of destruction peaked in 2004 at 13, 
813 civilians killed. While the numbers themselves may not represent success or failure 
of an operation, the cause of those deaths offers a deeper perspective. First, the 
aggressive missions beginning in January 2007 created an environment of danger for 
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the people in the region. The use of air strikes, raids, and artillery to clear the city 
caused a massive amount of damage and loss of life. However, the SOI were another 
source of the death and destruction. Local forces consisted of concerned citizens, but 
also former insurgents. The explosive nature of tribal relations in the city would manifest 
again as the number of US forces decreased.21 Because of renewed violence, the US 
had to seek an alternative route for in hopes of victory. 
 The increase of violence at the end of 2007 hindered the goal of the US military. 
The plan was to switch from aggressive missions to maintaining the progress they had 
made. With the issue of insurgents migrating back into Baghdad, the objective was to 
increase the buffer between the Iraq government and insurgent strongholds. The 
response was Operation Phantom Phoenix, which lasted from January through July 
2008, which targeted al-Qaeda strongholds and their weapon caches. In the first three 
weeks of Phantom Phoenix, coalition forces detained 1,023 terrorists and killed another 
121.  By the end of the operation, soldiers had killed 900 insurgents and captured 
2,500.  Among those caught or killed were 92 high-value targets.  Soldiers also found 
351 weapons caches, 410 improvised explosive devices, three vehicle bomb and 
improvised explosive device factories, and four tunnel complexes. Deaths of both 
military and civilians plummeted in the Baghdad region by the spring of 2008, but media 
and scholarly writings do not explore further than the initial execution of the mission and 
do not consider the long-term consequences.22 
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 Phantom Phoenix was meant to be the mission that enabled the Iraq government 
to take over operations in Iraq. The missions conducted in 2008 effectively pushed re-
emerging insurgents back out of the Baghdad region but did not do an adequate job of 
retaining gains and handing power back to the Iraqis. Instead, the mission ended in the 
summer without increasing the operational efficiency of the Iraqi forces. Also, the 
government in Iraq was equally ineffective at providing the leadership needed to secure 
the country. Veterans of the operation recall the inability to permanently secure areas. 
Bill Piper remembers “local families who offered any assistance were typically killed 
when we moved into another neighborhood.” The displacement and targeting of families 
was severe. Timothy Taylor, a dismount with the 4th Infantry Division, was tasked with 
the duty of “recovering dead bodies out of the river” who belonged to “families of 
supporters.”  While the numbers of people killed dropped in 2008, the dependency on 
the US military to create stability stayed the same.23  
 By the conclusion of the mission, the United States abruptly handed over 
significant parts of the operation to an ill-prepared Iraqi government and military. Many 
of the COP and JSS locations were disbanded and no longer used. Furthermore, the 
regular use of checkpoints and roadblocks subsided, and the street presence 
decreased. Another factor was the SOI, which by the fall of 2008 had disbanded due to 
a lack of pay by the Iraq government. As the members of the SOI left the local militias, 
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insurgent activities began to rise again. The fall of 2008 made the worst fears about 
reconciliation, stability, and a capable central government in Baghdad a reality.24 
The US military did make gains in Iraq, but also suffered significant losses. 
However, when looking at success and failure of an operation one must consider the 
objectives. For the Surge, the purpose was to help facilitate reconciliation between rival 
factions, rejuvenate the local economy, and provide a stable environment so the 
government in Iraq could take over in Baghdad and gain the recognition of the people. 
In the short-term, the Surge was very efficient in gaining territory, but did not yield 
results to create a permanent solution.25 Military personnel involved in the operations 
have a unique insight into how the Surge played out, and offer a first-hand account of 
the strategies implementation. 
The opinion of veterans involved in the Surge is that the operation was not a 
successful strategy. However, the reasons behind that answer vary. From the soldiers’ 
perspective, the Surge was incredibly violent and unforgiving. They perceived that 
violence in two separate ways. One perception is that the destructive nature of the 
Surge created more enemies than US forces could detain or kill. Sedrick Brown 
believed that “violence from previous deployments set us up for failure.” Eric Blackburn, 
when asked if objectives were met, stated “No they were not, I do not believe that it can 
be done.  Every kill, whether justified or not, will create more terrorists.”26  
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Another view is that the Surge was not violent enough and allowed for insurgents 
to slip through the cracks and thereby damaged the US reputation on an international 
scale. Dan Malubag stated “we were a bit to caring towards the local population,” and 
that “we were there to win the hearts and minds, but we also were a little too trusting 
with the local leaders.” Additionally, the conditions surrounding the Surge also raised 
questions among the US military. The lack of responsibility the Iraqi army and police 
were willing to take on to defend their own country also created concern. Furthermore, 
the amount of infiltration into Iraq organizations destroyed trust, coupled with the Iraq 
government’s lack of progress taking control of the situation, and the lack of urgency in 
regarding the political divide between groups in Baghdad. Thomas Monk contends that 
the goal was to assist “the state of Iraq and better equip them to handle their own 
problems,” but “the outcome was that Iraq was unable to maintain themselves without 
United States Military present, once we pulled out Iraq crumbled and now they are in a 
state of Islamic terror which is far worse than before the Surge.” With a lack of 
involvement from the citizenry and government, the opinion is that the Surge was 
doomed, as presented to the American people, from the start.27 
 The increase of troops created physical and psychological exhaustion among 
soldiers. In addition, the year of 2007 cost the US $155 billion, followed by a cost of 
$190 billion in 2008. The US lost over 1000 soldiers, while the cost in citizen lives are 
estimated to be over 20,000. The most glaring problem with the Surge is the outcome 
and the complete lack of willingness or desire to take over the responsibility and cost of 
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maintaining any progress made.28 Exposure to harmful toxins also created casualties, 
but the presence of danger eluded most soldiers.   
The operation did not stop costing the United States government when it 
concluded in 2008. Instead, recent findings have linked long-term injuries sustained by 
soldiers to actions taken during the Surge. The reports show exposure to contaminated 
water, uranium, and other chemicals during their time in Baghdad. Another point of 
concern was burn barrels, which became more widespread during the Surge due to a 
lack of running water and ability to remove waste properly. According to studies 
conducted in 2011, and again in 2015, the waste burn barrels had a direct correlation 
between veterans who have since suffered from respiratory illnesses like asthma, 
emphysema, and some reports of rare, but deadly lung diseases. The military also used 
burn pits and disposal sites to destroy explosives and weapons found during daily 
patrols. The proximity of the COP to the disposal sites during the Surge was very close 
due to security concerns. The inhalation of metal particles and exposure to dangerous 
chemicals released during the process of burning materials is believed to be connected 
brain damage. The damage appears as lesions on the brain, and the symptoms often 
manifest through nerve damage, severe headaches, and memory loss.29 Despite the 
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high risk of death and injury, these new locations in Baghdad were considered essential 
to achieving success during the operation. 
One point of contention regarding the success of the Surge is the lasting 
influences. When focusing on the short-term gains, the consensus has remained that 
the Surge was a tactical success. However, when examining the motives behind the 
operation, and the desired outcome the findings are different. The lack of planning 
during the invasion of Iraq is the culprit most people point to when describing the 
problems in Iraq. In reflection, the Surge was not so much different. Had the objective 
been to buy time to make a more permanent plan, the admission of success is 
inevitable. The issue lies within the idea of the clearing, controlling, and retaining the 
Baghdad beltway and stabilizing the region. As for the reduction in violence, the real 
question comes down to whether the findings reported in real time carry more weight 
than those released by the University of California Los Angeles. If a person does not 
believe the Surge was responsible for the decrease in violence, the influence of the 
Surge suffers. When the Surge ended in the summer of 2008, the country was no closer 
to reconciliation than when the operations began. The temporary successes of the 
Surge did not generate lasting results. When measuring the Surge based on its 
objectives, the strategy falls short of the expectation that a military victory was 
achievable. 30 
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The Surge was a response to a complicated and failing situation in the Baghdad 
beltway. The implications of a collapse in Iraq carried the risk of losing political power, 
international influence, and a damaged projection of strength for the United States. The 
Bush Administration recognized the dire situation, and responded with a plan they 
anticipated could stabilize the region and offer a path to a military victory. The need for 
such an operation existed due to the spike in violence throughout 2006 because of 
increased sectarian tension that spilled over into a civil war. The new strategy aimed to 
decrease that violence while pursuing stability through a combination of political and 
military action, giving the operation a reputation over the past decade. 
 Coverage of the Surge, both in the media and in academia, views the operation 
in a positive light. In academia, the primary evidence used to support the claims of 
success is operational efficiency, the decline of sectarian violence, an increase of 
economic activity, and humanitarian efforts. Historian Kimberly Kagan also credits the 
Surge with “changing the operational art of counterinsurgency.” Fellow Historian Dale 
Andradé explains that humanitarian and economic factors influenced his perception of 
the operation. Retired Colonel Peter Mansoor, Chair of Military History at Ohio State 
University, argues that the vision of General David Petraeus allowed for the alliance 
between Sunni leadership and Coalition Forces, thus reducing the violence between the 
sects in Baghdad1 However, when exploring the Surge, it is essential to compare the 
intended outcome with what the operation actually accomplished. 
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The new strategy would increase troop levels by over 20,000, create a stable 
environment in Baghdad, and begin transferring the power of governing from the United 
States back to Iraq. The presentation of the Surge to the American people explained 
how the operation would secure a military victory, restore order, and allow for their 
forces to reduce combat responsibilities. The success of this plan would limit the 
number of soldiers needed in Iraq and would enable the re-allocation of resources spent 
in Iraq to winning the effort in Afghanistan. Despite warnings from Generals George 
Casey, John Abizaid, and Peter Chiarelli, who warned that an increase of troops would 
damage the situation in Iraq, the Surge began in January 2007.2  
The original purpose of the Surge, according to the speech given by President 
Bush, was to improve security in Baghdad, create a stable region, and begin the 
process of handing over operations to Iraqi officials. President Bush concluded that the 
new strategy would offer the opportunity of a victory through “tactical objectives, such as 
destroying a safe haven for insurgents; operational objectives, such as securing a city; 
strategic objectives, such as establishing a safe and democratic government.”  The 
adoption of the new strategy was preceded by an unprecedented year of bloodshed. To 
stop this violence, the Surge sought to employ plans that involved both political and 
military components. Political aspirations for the government in Iraq consisted of gaining 
the trust of the people, providing essential needs, and reinstating elected officials in an 
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official capacity. For the new approach to succeed, the United States had to complete a 
series of maneuvers in the region, which incorporated both Coalition and Iraqi forces.  
A significant first step was the Baghdad Security Plan, which General David 
Petraeus saw as a way to further develop the relationship between the United States 
and local Sunni leadership. Consistently providing a constant presence was a weakness 
of previous years. The Baghdad Security Plan sought to remedy this problem by 
procuring locations in the Baghdad region to establish Combat Outposts and Joint 
Security Stations. These two additions offered the opportunity to place soldiers in the 
areas they patrolled continuously with supplies and reinforcements nearby. In addition, 
the new locations were meant to build trust between the American forces and civilians in 
the city and rekindle the hearts and minds campaign after the previous year of 
violence.3 
Problems with this portion of the plan was the timing. The Baghdad Security Plan 
began in early 2007 and continued into the summer. In June, Operation Phantom 
Thunder commenced, which signaled the beginning of aggressive clearing of the 
Baghdad region. The purpose of the Combat Outposts and Joint Security Stations was 
to offer a continuous presence, a quicker response time, and a rapport with the 
community. However, at the start of Operation Phantom Thunder, many COP and JSS 
were not adequately equipped and lacked sufficient manpower. Logistically the 
Baghdad Security Plan did not provide the volume of support needed. Strategically, 
considerations of culture and the US perception in Baghdad were overlooked and 
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added to the already tense situation between sects. Tactically, these locations 
contributed to the rapid pace that Coalition Forces moved through the city between 
June and August 2007. Lastly, the Joint Security Stations gave American forces a place 
to train Iraqi Police, in some situations screen potential militia members, and stage 
Quick Reaction Forces during combat operations.4  
Leadership in the US military believed that this security plan would make 
Baghdad a safer city. Taking notes from David Galula's book, Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice, General David Petraeus understood that "The population 
becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy." With a citizen-
centric plan developed, General Petraeus sought to win the numbers game in Baghdad.   
By providing safety, Petraeus hoped to create a stable environment, which relied on two 
factors. First, working in tandem with security, was the expulsion of al-Qaeda. There 
were no illusions, if insurgents remained in the city and undermined progress, the future 
of Iraq was in question. The second part relied on the Iraqi government increasing its 
functionality and presence. The government in Iraq was the most critical component for 
a permanent Surge success.5 
When the initial missions to clear Baghdad began, the level of US readiness did 
not match the expectation of the military strategy. Relying on kinetic operations, soldiers 
cleared the city using airstrikes, raids, and a continuous presence. Immense violence 
ensued, which followed the pattern of military actions in 2006, and many insurgents 
were captured or killed. However, many of the estimated insurgents fled the city.  The 
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systematic clearing Baghdad was bloody, but the Army initially had relative success in 
expelling al-Qaeda. Even when the American soldiers finished the first phase of seek 
and destroy missions in Baghdad, however, the situation on the ground was still chaotic 
and needed further support to achieve a lasting influence in the region. 
During the second phase of the Surge, violence peaked in regards to the loss of 
civilian lives. Also, the number of soldiers killed in action remained high as the focus of 
the Coalition Forces shifted from clearing to controlling the region. The military, assisted 
by Iraqi forces, moved further outside the city in an attempt to secure the whole region. 
Coverage of the Surge focused on the territories gained and the defeat of al-Qaeda as 
opposed to the future of Iraq. The pressure applied during the first two phases routed 
the enemy and establish hope that a military victory was achievable. Logistically, the 
clearing phase of the Surge displayed the capabilities of American transportation by 
relocating combat vehicles, weapons, ammunition, food, and water for over 10,000 
combat soldiers. Strategically, the approach to the mission was not planned to shape 
the future. The objective was to clear Baghdad, but the US lacked a subsequent plan 
and ended with significant number of insurgents merely moving to another location to 
fight another day. Tactically, the Coalition Forces were sound. While some of their 
tactics raised concerns, such as the use of white phosphorous munitions, the removal of 
the insurgents highlighted tactical superiority, especially at night. Immediately following 
the clearing phase came the attempt to control the region, which began in August and 
lasted until January of 2008.6 
                                                           
6 Staff Writer, "Operation Phantom Thunder," Institute for the Study of War, August 15, 2007, 




The United States initiated Operation Phantom Strike directly following Operation 
Phantom Thunder. Beginning in August 2007, Phantom Strike sought to capitalize on 
the victories of the previous mission. With Baghdad cleared, the next objective was to 
gain control of the surrounding areas. Missions faced outwards as American and Iraqi 
forces pushed to secure key locations outside of city’s limits. In addition, checkpoints 
became imperative to the effort to stop the flow of weapons, regulating travel, and 
attempting to identify car bombs before they entered the secured sector. The logistical 
performance of this phase of the Surge was underwhelming. Technologically the United 
States was scrambling to keep up with the evolution of the insurgents’ methods of 
attack. General Kevin Bergner, a Special Assistant to the President, admitted in a press 
conference in Baghdad that “Despite this progress, insurgents are still capable of 
staging large-scale attacks.” The United States solution to these continued attacks was 
to use more Iraqi forces. One way to achieve this was through checkpoints and security 
stations, which remained understaffed moving into the fall. The strategy was good in 
theory but still needed a follow-up plan to establish long-lasting stability in Baghdad 
after gaining control. The tactical approach to this portion was also lacking. Reliance on 
checkpoints put American forces in increased danger. Iraqi Police and local militias 
were responsible for most checkpoint operations, which brought up concerns of 
corruption and infiltration of the groups by insurgents, and highlighted the almost non-
existent third objective: to transfer the power back to the government in Iraq.7 
                                                           
7 "Operation Phantom Strike Builds on Security Progress, Intelligence," United States Department 




Success during the Surge was often short-lived. The nature of insurgency made 
winning in Iraq a significant challenge. When the United States went on the offensive, 
the insurgents would flee the area, only to return at a different time and disturb any 
plans of peace or stability. Infrastructure in Baghdad was another factor not adequately 
planned for in the initial stages of implementation. Dilapidated buildings, road erosion, 
and sewage overflow caused significant obstacles to successful operations. These 
conditions also contributed to the lack of cooperation between religious sects and the 
confidence citizens had in their government’s ability to lead. 
The failure of the Iraqi government to perform during the Surge contributed 
heavily to the outcome. Corruption and resistance to compromise made the situation in 
Iraq dismal. Furthermore, the Iraqi government also continued to struggle to provide 
services to citizens throughout the country with any regularity. The government in Iraq 
abandoned most projects implemented during the Surge, such as local militias, sewer 
treatment plants, and the distribution of potable water. Logistically Iraqi officials could 
not entice enough citizens to fill the roles needed and did not support the ones who did 
report. Pleas from the United States did not help the situation either. General Kevin J. 
Bergner continued by stating "It’s very difficult, but we’re continuing to pressure those 
networks and to encourage Iraqi people to come forward, work with their security forces, 
work with their government, because that’s the fundamental thing that helps deal with 
the kinds of terrorist problems that are plaguing the Iraqi people,” Also, the Iraqi 
government did not display any type of strategic or tactical vision for the situation in 
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Iraq. Instead, the focus returned to tribal tension as corruption further plagued attempts 
to improve the future of the country.8 
A continuing problem for the outcome of the Surge lay in the presentation that 
US officials made to the American people. Members of the Bush Administration 
portrayed the plan as a long-term solution to deeply rooted problems in Iraq. The Surge 
failed to capitalize on the momentum of success. Instead, the production of short bursts 
of progress gave way to a lack of preparation. The operation correctly identified issues 
that existed, but the course of action taken continued to be short-sighted. The Surge 
fought the symptoms of the conflict by attacking sources of violence, such as al-Qaeda, 
without identifying why they were supported by locals or seeking to remedy their 
methods of recruitment. The goal was to "continue to target terrorists who kill innocent 
Iraqi citizens and try to disrupt the political process," yet the United States failed to 
address the collateral damage created through military action.9 
The Surge is neither a complete failure nor a complete success. Logistically, the 
United States showed the capability to move massive amounts of equipment, supplies, 
and soldiers at a rapid pace. However, US leadership also sent soldiers into combat 
with faulty gear and inadequate training. Strategically, the same lack of vision that 
plagued the invasion reappeared in aspects of the Surge. Strategists of the Surge 
focused on the problem directly in front of them but failed to anticipate subsequent 
moves needed to keep momentum when they achieved their objectives. Tactically, the 
US military displayed skill and efficiency to clear large combat targets and secure 
                                                           
8 Ibid. 
9 Anthony H. Cordesman and Emma R. Davies, Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, 
vol. 1, Praeger Security International (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2007), 316. 
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multiple types of locations. Unfortunately, the goal of the Surge was to relinquish 
combat responsibilities to the Iraqi military and local militias, which proved to be a false 
hope.   
When reflecting on the Surge a decade later, the most visible weaknesses 
surround the strategic objectives and outcomes. Starting in January 2007, the mission 
lasted until May 2008. During that sixteen-month time, the United States and Iraq 
accomplished many goals, yet almost all evidence of success disappeared within six 
months of the Surge’s ending. This research has highlighted some of the achievements 
of the operation but also displayed them as short-lived victories that did not create long-
lasting influence in Iraq. Nonetheless, the most damaging aspect of the Surge was the 
depiction given by the Bush Administration and media before its implementation. 
Supporters of the Surge were promised a permanent solution to the chaos in Iraq and 
received only momentary results. Colonel Douglas Macgregor claims "the Surge in Iraq 
won nothing, it only bought time. The thing that worries me most of all is what happens 
over the next 12 to 24 months in Iraq. Are we not actually setting Iraq up for a worse 
civil war than the one we have already seen?"10 The attempt to stabilize Iraq failed, and 
the eradication of insurgent safe havens did not materialize. Instead, factionalism 
deepened, the Iraqi government did not regain a hold on the power, and the operation 
fostered a new type of insurgent.    
The historical memory of the veterans is also an essential perspective to 
consider. By asking the question “Were objectives met,” the answers are different, yet 
                                                           
10 Guy Raz, "Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge," National Public Radio, January 08, 
2008, accessed February 09, 2018, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543. 
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similar. One response was “if you look at what we did there and look at the country now, 
we did not meet the intent of establishing a stable, secure, running government.” 
Another soldier claimed, “No they were not, they know the terrain and escape routes, 
the best places to ambush and every kill, whether justified or not, will create more 
terrorists.” An additional question asked was “is there anything you would like to add, in 
retrospect, concerning the perceptions and realities of the Surge?” The response to this 
varied, but also displayed a different approach to processing the operation. Common 
answers included the phrases “it has taken a toll on me,” or “it changed me as a 
person.” Others, who spent more than one deployment in Iraq, claimed that the Surge 
“rekindled the hatred I have for Iraq,” and “There was still a stigma from the prior 
deployment which made returning soldiers hold hatred against the locals and made the 
Surge more difficult to carry out.” The Surge influenced more than just the United States 
relationship in the Middle East. The remnants of the operation still exist in American 
today.11  
When considering the viability of such operations, there is little discussion about 
the level of intensity and the duration of the mission. The Surge lasted for 16 months, 
with the first ten months being the most aggressive. However, regarding the individuals 
interviewed, the average soldier was deployed for 14 months. The longevity of these 
missions and the stress on military personnel are not considered in the equation of 
success. The Surge represents, in general, a tactically sound mission that lacked real 
                                                           
11 Dan Malubag. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, August 12, 2016; Eric Blackburn. 
emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Spokane, WA, September 12, 2016; Thomas Monk. emailed to Matthew 
Buchanan, Dixon, CA, August 24, 2016; 
Bill Morris. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Auburn, AL, August 9, 2016; Kimberley Ankrom. emailed to 




strategic planning as to how the operation would influence Iraq a decade later. Despite 
the intent, the Surge further destabilized the region, took massive amounts of resources 
away from Afghanistan, and offered no real long-term solution to the foreseeable future 
of Iraq. Small achievements aside, the Surge became an attempt to use a logistical 













Baker, James Addison, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger. The Iraq Study Group  
 Report. New York: Vintage Books, 2006. 
Battle, Joyce, "Pentagon "Rapid Reaction Media Team" for Iraq," Iraq: The Media War Plan,  
 May 8, 2007, accessed October 29, 2017,        
 http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/index.htm. 
Bush, George. “President Bush Addresses the Nation on Iraq.” Washington D.C., January 10,  
 2007. Accessed November 14, 2016.        
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/10/. 
Filkins, Dexter, James Glanz, and James Glantz, "With Airpower and Armor, Troops Enter  
 Rebel-Held City," New York Times, November 08, 2004, accessed October 30, 2017,  
  http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/08/international/with-airpower-and-armor-troops-  
 enterrebelheld-city.htm. 
Katzman, Kenneth.  CRS Report RL31339: Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, 2008, 
 Accessed October 18, 2016, https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organizations/106174.pdf. 
 “Marne 6 Sends: Meeting the Needs of the Iraqi People,” Dog Face Daily, 1 June 2008, 1. 
Sanger, David E. Michael R. Gordon, and John F. Burns. "Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in '06, Bush Team 
 Says." The New York Times. January 02, 2007. Accessed October 19, 2016. 
 https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/washington/02war.html?mwrsm.  
Sullivan, Meg. "UCLA Study of Satellite Imagery Casts Doubt on Surge's Success in Baghdad."  
 UCLA Newsroom. September 18, 2008. Accessed August 12, 2016,    
 http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-study-of-satellite-imagery-62852. 
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24:  





Andradé, Dale. Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in  
 Iraq, 2007-2008. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 
2010.Bacevich, Andrew J. The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by  
 War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
________ Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War. New York:   
 Metropolitan Books, 2010. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Robert Michael Gates, and Suzanne Maloney. Iran Time for a New  
 Approach. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004. 
Bush, George W. Decision Points. New York: Crown Publishers, 2010. 
Donnelly, Thomas, and Frederick W. Kagan. Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win  
 on New Battlefields. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2010. 
Kagan, Kimberly. The Surge: A Military History. New York: Encounter Books, 2009. 
96 
 
Knowlton, Bill. The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq, Industrial College of  
 the Armed Forces National Defense University, 2010. Accessed September 24, 2016.  
 http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo69309.  
Mansoor, Peter R. Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the  
 Iraq War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.  
Ricks, Thomas E. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military   
 Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008. New York: Penguin Press, 2009. 
Sjursen, Daniel A. Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the   
 Surge. Lebanon, NH: Foredge, 2015. 
 Woodward, Bob. The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008, New York: Simon  






"A Case for Additional Troops." Washington Times (Washington, DC), December 15, 2006.  
 Accessed January 4, 2018.          
 http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-155929304.html?refid=easy_hf. 
Associated Press. "Iraq draft constitution approved, officials say." NBCNews.com. October 25,  
 2005. Accessed December 16, 2017.        
 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9803257/#.Wm3X3dWnHrc.       
Barr, Cameron W., and Karl Vick. "30 Marines, Sailor Die In Copter Crash in Iraq." The   
 Washington Post. January 27, 2005. Accessed January 28, 2018.     
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36938-2005Jan26.html. 
Carter, Phillip, and Owen West. "Body counts in Iraq and Vietnam." Slate Magazine. December  
 27, 2004. Accessed December 27, 2017.             
 http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2004/12/iraq_2004_looks_li 
 ke_vietnam_1966.html.                                                                                                   
Crawley, Vince. "Clearing the Way for Elections: “Some insurgents May Have Fled Fallujah  
 Before Forces Arrived." Marine Corps Times (Springfield), November 22, 2004. Accessed 
 December 18, 2017, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxy195.nclive.org/apps/news/.  
Crook, J. R. (2006). U.S. Defends Use of White Phosphorus Munitions in Iraq. The American  
 Journal of International Law, 100(2), 487. Retrieved from      
 http://proxy195.nclive.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/201155134?ac 
 countid=14968. 
Diamond, John. "Iraq Weapons Assessments 'Dead Wrong." USA Today. March 31, 2005.  
 Accessed June 14, 2017.          
 https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-03-31-intel-panel_x.htm.  
Henry, Ed. "Bush: U.S. to Stay in Iraq till War is Won." CNN. December 1, 2005. Accessed  
 April 8, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/11/30/us.iraq/index.html. 
Hernandez, Nelson Hernandez, and Omar Fekeiki. "Iraqi Premier, Cabinet Sworn In." 
 Washington Post. May 21, 2006. Accessed January 4, 2018.     
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/20/AR2006052000392.html. 
"Iraq Study Group Report Released; Saddam Hussein Executed." Foreign Policy Bulletin 17, no. 02 
  (January 2007). Accessed January 20, 2018, doi:10.1017/s1052703607000160. 
Journal, Wall Street. "The Iraq Muddle Group." Wall Street Journal. December 07, 2006.   
 Accessed January 4, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116545660766942936. 
97 
 
Jr., Andrew F. Krepinevich. "How to Win in Iraq." Foreign Affairs. October 2, 2005. Accessed  
 June 16, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2005-09-01/how-win-iraq. 
Kamp, Nina, Michael O'hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz. "The State of Iraq: An Update." New  
 York Times. September 30, 2006. Accessed January 4, 2018.     
 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/opinion/01ohanlon.html. 
Kamp, Nina, Michael O'hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz. "The State of Iraq: An Update.” New  
 York Times. September 30, 2006. Accessed January 6, 2018.     
 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/opinion/01ohanlon.html. 
Keane, Jack, and Frederick W. Kagan. “The Right Type of 'Surge'." Washington Post.   
 December 27, 2006. Accessed August 8, 2016.       
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-        
 dyn/content/article/2006/12/26/AR2006122600773.html. 
Knickmeyer, Ellen, and Bassam Sebti. "Toll in Iraq's Deadly Surge: 1,300." Washington   
 Post. February 28, 2006. Accessed January 30, 2018,     
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/27/AR2006022701128.ht
 ml. 
Kolhmann, Evan F. "The State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: 2006." Central Intelligence  
 Agency. December 29, 2006. Accessed July 18, 2017.      
 https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-       
 compound/54/54F87F15D446471E9A12A4A0324BCB87_iraqinsurgency1206.pdf. 
Larsen, Ian, and Lauren Sucher. "Iraq Study Group Fact Sheet." United States Institute of  Peace. 
December 20, 2006. Accessed January 4, 2018.      
 https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/isg_fact_sheet.pdf. 
Monitz, David. "Army Misses Recruiting Goals." USA Today. March 2, 2005. Accessed January  
 21, 2018.            
 https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-03-02-army-goal_x.htm.  
Pike, John. "Military." Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction | Reports to Congress.  
 January 30, 2005. Accessed January 4, 2018.       
 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/sigir-jan05_report.htm.  
Purdum, Todd S. "Flashback to the 60's: A Sinking Sensation of Parallels between Iraq and  
 Vietnam." New York Times. January 29, 2005. Accessed December 27, 2017.   
 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/29/politics/flashback-to-the-60s-a-sinking-sensation-of- 
 parallels-between-iraq.html. 
Reid, Harry. "Iraq Study Group Report Reaction, Dec 6 2006 | Video." C-SPAN.org. December  
 6, 2006. Accessed January 16, 2018.        
 https://www.c-span.org/video/?195658-3%2Firaq-study-group-report-reaction. 
Roberts, Joel. "U.S. Death Toll in Iraq Hits 1,500." CBS News. March 04, 2005.    
 Accessed December 15, 2017.         
 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-death-toll-in-iraq-hits-1500/. 
Saddir, Abdul-Qadir. “Fallujah Residents Angry Over Destruction.” Newspaper Source Plus,  
 Jan 11, 2005. Accessed December 18, 2017      
 proxy195.nclive.org/login?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsearch.ebscohost.com%2Flogin.aspx%3 
 Fdirect.  





Staff Writer. "Death toll for U.S. Troops in Iraq Reaches 2,000." NBC News. October 26,   
 2005. Accessed December 15, 2017.        
 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9772398/#.Wm3Ur9WnHrc. 
Staff Writer. "A Bipartisan Path to Surrender?" Washington Times (Washington, DC),   
 December 7, 2006. Accessed December 16, 2017.       
 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/dec/6/20061206-095730-9143r/f. 
Tawfeeq, Mohammed. "PM: Iraqi Troops Battle-Ready in 2007." CNN. May 23, 2006. Accessed  
 January 4, 2018. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/05/25/iraq.main/.  
Tyson, Ann Scott. "Bush's Defense Budget Biggest Since Reagan Era." Washington Post.  





Anderson, Terry H. Bush’s Wars. New York: Oxford Press, 2011. 
Ardolino, Bill. Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheiks, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda. Annapolis:  
 Naval Institute Press, 2014. 
Bacevich, Andrew J. America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History. New   
 York,NY: Random House, 2016. 
Camp, Richard D. Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq.   
 Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009. 
Gallup, Inc. "Iraq." Gallup.com. Accessed January 20, 2018.      
 http://news.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx. 
Gallup, Inc. "Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush." Presidential Approval Ratings -- George 
 W. Bush, accessed January 16, 2018.     
 http://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx. 
Richard S. New Dawn: The Battles for Fallujah. New York, NY: Savas Beatie, 2011. 
Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003–2005. . New York:  
 Penguin, 2005. 
Robbins, James S. "Behind-Scenes Strategy That Led to Iraq Surge." The Washington Times  
 (Washington, DC), March 10, 2009. Accessed January 4, 2018.     
 http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-195276812.html?refid=easy_hf. 
Rubin, Michael. Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes. New York:   





Agnew, John, Thomas W. Gillespie, Jorge Gonzalez, and Brian Min. "Baghdad Nights:   
 Evaluating the US Military ‘Surge’ Using Nighttime Light Signatures." Environment and  
 Planning A 40, no. 10 (October 1, 2008): 2285-295. Accessed February 3, 2018.   
 doi:doi.org/10.1068/a41200. 
Berner, Joshua. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Tahlequah, OK, November 7, 2016. 
Bruno, Greg. "Finding a Place for the 'Sons of Iraq'." Council on Foreign Relations. April 23,  




________ "The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security." Washington Post. April  28, 2008. 
  Accessed February 09, 2018.       
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042801120. 
Burkhart, Anthony. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, September 23, 2016. 
Chambers, Bruce. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Tavares, FL, August 23, 2016. 
CQ Transcript Wire. "Petraeus, Crocker Testify at Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing on Iraq." 
  Washington Post. April 8, 2008. Accessed February 09, 2018.  
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/iraq_hearing_040808.html. 
Cullen, Patrick. “Iraq: Armed Humanitarianism, International Relations and Security Network."  
 Resources – Center for Security Studies | ETH Zurich. March 5, 2008. Accessed   
 February 6, 2018, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-
 Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9- E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=54134 16 See 
 Abby Stoddard%2CAdele Harmer and. 
Editors, SWJ. "CCO Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor." Small Wars Journal. November 24,  
 2008. Accessed February 4, 2018.         
 http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cmo-interview-with-colonel-peter-mansoor. 
"Fact Sheet: A New Way Forward in Iraq." National Archives and Records Administration.  
 January 10, 2007. Accessed February 4, 2018.       
 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html. 
Glanz, James, and Stephen Farrell. "Militias Seizing Control of Iraqi Electricity Grid." The New  
 York Times. August 22, 2007. Accessed February 8, 2018.     
 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/23/world/middleeast/23electricity.html. 
Jimenez, Brian. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Greenville, NC 
Jones, James L. The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq.  
 2007. MS, Washington D. C. September 9, 2007. Accessed February 8, 2018.  
 https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/independent-commission-security-forces-iraq 
Kaminski, Matthew. "Why the Surge Worked." Wall Street Journal. September 20, 2008.   
 Accessed February 06, 2018.         
 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122186492076758643. 
Kane, Sean. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbus, GA, August 23, 2016 
Malubag, Dan. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, August 12, 2016. 
McCain, John and Joe Lieberman. "The Surge Worked." The Wall Street Journal. January 10,  
 2008. Accessed February 06, 2018.         
 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119992665423979631. 
Monk, Thomas. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Dixon, CA, August 24, 2016. 
Morris, Bill. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Auburn, AL, August 9, 2016. 
Raiford, Kenneth. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Houston, TX, July 18, 2017 
Raz, Guy. "Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge." NPR. January 08, 2008. Accessed 
 February 09, 2018. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543. 
"Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces." Institute for the Study of War. February 21, 2008.   
 Accessed February 09, 2018.         
 http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sons-iraq-and-awakening-forces. 
Sullivan, Meg. "UCLA Study of Satellite Imagery Casts Doubt on Surge's Success in Baghdad."  





SWJ Editors, "CCO Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor," Small Wars Journal, November 24,  
 2008, accessed February 4, 2018,         
 http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cco-interview-with-colonel-peter-mansoor. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues  
 for Congressional Oversight." U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO).  
 January 09, 2007. Accessed February 4, 2018.       
 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP. 
Wise, Michael. "Papers Give Peek Inside al Qaeda in Iraq." CNN. June 11, 2008. Accessed  
 February 6, 2018.          
 http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/11/al.qaeda.iraq/index.html. 
Young, Thomas. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Lynchburg, VA, November 29, 2016. 
 
Secondary Sources 
Anderson, Terry H. Bush’s Wars. New York: Oxford Press, 2011. 
Andradé, Dale. Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in  
 Iraq, 2007-2008. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010. 
Beinart, Peter. "Admit It: The Surge Worked." Washington Post. January 18, 2009.   
 Accessed February 06, 2018. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-    
 dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011603719.html.   
Christoff, Joseph A. Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. Collingdale, PA: Diane  
 Publishing, 2010. 
Gamel, Kim. "U.S. Wasted Billions in Rebuilding Iraq." NBC News. August 29, 2010.   
 Accessed February 6, 2018.         
 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38903955/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-wasted- billions-
rebuilding-iraq/#.WoCCRminHrd. 
Juhasz, Antonia. "Why the War in Iraq was Fought for Big Oil." CNN. April 15, 2013. Accessed  
 February 8, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-
 juhasz/index.html. 
Mansoor, Peter R. Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the  
 Iraq War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.  
Petraeus, David. "How We Won in Iraq." Foreign Policy. October 29, 2013. Accessed February  
 06, 2018. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/29/how-we-won-in-iraq/. 
Shadid, Anthony, and Saad Sarhan. "Peacemaking Event Is Attacked in Iraq." Washington Post. January 
  03, 2009. Accessed February 10, 2018.   
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/02/AR2009010200692.ht
 ml?hpid=moreheadlines. 
Simon, Steven. "The Price of the Surge." Foreign Affairs. July 08, 2014. Accessed February 09,  
 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2008-05-03/price-surge. 
Shamoo, Adil E., and Bonnie Bricker. "The Costs of War for Oil." Foreign Policy In Focus.  
 October 19, 2013. Accessed February 13, 2018. http://fpif.org/the_costs_of_war_for_oil/. 
Wilbanks, Mark, and Efraim Karsh. "How the "Sons of Iraq" Stabilized Iraq." Middle East   
 Forum: Promoting America's Interest, 4th ser., 17, no. Fall (October 1, 2010): 57-70.  
 October 1, 2010. Accessed February 6, 2010.       
 http://www.meforum.org/2788/sons-of-iraq.  
 





Ackerman, Spencer. "Training Iraq’s Death Squads." The Nation. May 17, 2007. Accessed  
 February 20, 2018. https://www.thenation.com/article/training-iraqs-death-squads/. 
Ankrom. Kimberley emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Lynchburg, VA, November, 2017. 
Associated Press. "2007 was the Deadliest Year for U.S. Troops." NBC News. December 31, 2007. 
 Accessed February 20, 2018.   
 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22451069/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/was-deadliest-
 year-us-troops-iraq/#.WpWW92inHrc. 
Beaumont, Peter. "Fatigue Cripples US army in Iraq." The Observer. August 11, 2007. Accessed February 
 15, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/12/usa.iraq. 
Beehner, Lionel. "Is U.S. Troop Morale Slipping?" Council on Foreign Relations. June 14, 2007.  
 Accessed February 16, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-troop-morale-
 slipping. 
Blackburn, Eric. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Spokane, WA, September 12, 2016. 
Burns, Robert. "Pentagon Condemns Iraq Poison Gas Attack." Washington Post. March 30, 2007. 
 Accessed February 18, 2018. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
 dyn/content/article/2007/03/30/AR2007033001135.html. 
Brown, Sedrick. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Clarksville, TN, August 9, 2016. 
Bruno, Greg. "Finding a Place for the 'Sons of Iraq'." Council on Foreign Relations. April 23,  
 2008. Accessed February 10, 2018.         
 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/finding-place-sons-iraq 
Cordesman, Anthony H., and Emma R. Davies. Iraq's Insurgency and The Road To Civil  
 Conflict. Vol. 1. Praeger Security International. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2007. 
"DOD IG Report on MRAP Delays." POGO Project On Government Oversight. December 10,  
 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018.        
 http://www.pogo.org/about/press-room/releases/2008/ns-mrap-
 20081210.html?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F.  
Garrels, Anne. "U.S. Troops Spread Thin Despite Surge." NPR. May 17, 2007. Accessed  
 February 16, 2018. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10226407. 
Hambling, David. "MRAP Hazards: Drowning, Electrocution, Cancer." Wired. July 17, 2008.  
 Accessed February 16, 2018. https://www.wired.com/2008/07/mrap-hazards-dr/. 
H.R. Rep. No. 110 Congress-V. 153 Pt. 3 at 4030-4048 (2007). 
Hsia, Timothy. "A Quick Review of Combat Outposts (COPs)." Small Wars Journal. March  
 2008. Accessed February 16, 2018. file:///home/chronos/u-
 2efd1c7716ce4141fc985a128349ad72c1c3695b/Downloads/138-hsia.pdf. 
Johnson, Devlin. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Perry, GA, August 9, 2016. 
Keane, Jack, and Frederick W. Kagan. “The Right Type of 'Surge'." Washington Post.   
 December 27, 2006. Accessed August 8, 2016.       
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/12/26/AR2006122600773. 
Kruzel, John J. " Odierno Highlights Operations Phantom Strike, Phantom Thunder." United  
 States Department of Defense. August 17, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018.   
 http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47086. 
Martinez, Luis. "Surge Numbers Approach 30,000." ABC News. March 1, 2007. Accessed  
 February 12, 2018. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2958331&page=1. 
 
Moss, Michael. "Pentagon Study Links Fatalities to Body Armor." The New York Times.   






North, Oliver. "IRAQ EXCLUSIVE: Troops' Spirits Remain High, See Fruits of Labor Despite  
 Political Pessimists." Fox News. December 7, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018. 
 http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/07/iraq-exclusive-troops-spirits-remain-high-see-
 fruits-labor-despite-political.html. 
Piper, Bill. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kissimmee, FL, August 9, 2016 
Press Release. “Defense AFP News Order General Dynamics Awarded $108 Million for   
 Production of Reactive Armor for Bradley Fighting Vehicle." General Dynamics Awarded  
 $108 Million for Production of Reactive Armor for Bradley Fighting Vehicle. August 20,  
 2007. Accessed February 10, 2018. http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-  
 view/release/3/85364/gd-wins-%24108m-for-bradley-reactive-armor.html 
Press Release. "Operation Phantom Phoenix: Pursuit of al-Qaeda continues." CENTCOM.  
 January 14, 2008. Accessed February 20, 2018.       
 http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-   
 View/Article/903464/operation-phantom-phoenix-pursuit-of-al-qaeda-continues/. 
Staff Writer. “Operation Phantom Thunder." Institute for the Study of War. August 15, 2007.  
 Accessed February 16, 2018.         
 http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-thunder. 
Staff Writer. "Operation Phantom Strike." Institute for the Study of War. February 2, 2008.  
 Accessed February 16, 2018.         
 http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-strike. 
Staff Writer. "This Year Deadliest for U.S. Troops in Iraq." Reuters. November 06, 2007.   
 Accessed February 20, 2018.      
 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-soldiers/this-year-deadliest-for-u-s-troops-in-
 iraq-idUSYAT64897120071106. 
Staff Writer. "Operation Phantom Phoenix." Institute for the Study of War. August 23, 2008.  
 Accessed February 20, 2018.         
 http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-phoenix. 
Sullivan, Meg. "UCLA Study of Satellite Imagery Casts Doubt on Surge's Success in Baghdad."  
 UCLA Newsroom. September 18, 2008. Accessed August 12, 2016.    
 http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-study-of-satellite-imagery-62852. 
Taylor, Timothy. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Cullman, Al, September, 28, 2016. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues  
 for Congressional Oversight." U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO).  
 January 09, 2007. Accessed February 4, 2018.       
 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP. 
Watson, Cody. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Missoula, MT, August 9, 2016. 
Wood, Sarah. "Operation Phantom Strike Builds on Security Progress, Intelligent." United States  
 Department of Defense. August 15, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018.    
 http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47057. 
Wood, Sarah. "Baghdad Security Plan Can Work, Commander Says." United States Department of 
  Defense. February 16, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018.   
 http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=3082. 
Wright, Anthony. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kyle, TX, September, 23, 2016. 






DeGrandpre, Andrew, and Andrew Tilghman. "Iran Linked to Deaths of 500 U.S. Troops in Iraq,  
 Afghanistan." Military Times. Jan. & feb., 2015. Accessed February 18, 2018.  
 https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2015/07/14/iran-linked-to-deaths-of-
 500-u-s-troops-in-iraq-afghanistan/. 
Dobransky, Steve. “Why the U.S. Failed in Iraq: Baghdad at the Crossroads.” Middle East  Forum. Middle, 
 November 18, 2014. Last modified November 18, 2014.  Accessed February 20, 2018. 
 http://www.meforum.org/3680/iraq-us-failure.  
Gamel, Kim. "U.S. Wasted Billions in Rebuilding Iraq." NBC News. August 29, 2010.   
 Accessed February 6, 2018.          
 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38903955/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-wasted- 
 billions-rebuilding-iraq/#.WoCCRminHrd. 
Ismay, John. "An Iraq Veteran's Experience with Chemical Weapons." New York Times.   
 October 16, 2014. Accessed February 16, 2018.       
 https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/an-iraq-veterans-experience-with-chemical- 
 weapons/. 
Kagan, Kimberly. The Surge: A Military History. New York: Encounter Books, 2009. 
Kime, Patricia. "New Burn Pit Report: Lung Disease, High Blood Pressure Common in Exposed  
 Vets." Military Times. July 22, 2015. Accessed February 16, 2018.    
 https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-benefits/military-benefits/health-care/2015/07/22/new- 
 burn-pit-report-lung-disease-high-blood-pressure-common-in-exposed-vets/. 
Markel, M. Wade., Brian Shannon, and David E. Johnson. The 2008 Battle of Sadr City:   
 Reimagining Urban Combat. Rand Corporation, 2013. 
Mitchell, Greg, Joseph L. Galloway, and Bruce Springsteen. So Wrong for So Long: How the  
 Press, The Pundits, and The President Failed on Iraq. New York: Union Square   





Blackburn, Eric. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Spokane, WA, September 12, 2016. 
Galula, David. "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. PSI Classics of the 
 Counterinsurgency Era. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2006. 
Malubag, Dan. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, August 12, 2016. 
Monk, Thomas. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Dixon, CA, August 24, 2016. 
Morris, Bill. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Auburn, AL, August 9, 2016. 
Operation Phantom Strike Builds on Security Progress, Intelligence," United States Department of 
  Defense, August 15, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018, 
 http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47057. 
Piper, Bill. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kissimmee, FL, August 9, 2016 
Raz, Guy. "Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge," National Public Radio, January 08,  2008, 
accessed February 09, 2018, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543. 
Sarah Wood, "Baghdad Security Plan Can Work, Commander Says," United States Department  of 
Defense, February 16, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018,   
 http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=3082.  
Staff Writer, "Operation Phantom Thunder," Institute for the Study of War, August 15, 2007. 







Andradé, Dale. Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in  
 Iraq, 2007-2008. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010. 
Kagan, Kimberly. The Surge: A Military History. New York: Encounter Books, 2009. 
Mansoor, Peter R. Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the  
 Iraq War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.  
 
 
